Deglobalization: What Business Historians Can Teach Managers

26 03 2017

17397546-abstract-word-cloud-for-deglobalization-with-related-tags-and-terms-stock-photo

Deglobalization is the current buzzword, as I pointed out in a  blog post I published soon after the WEF meeting in Davos.  Actually economists have been talking talking about deglobalization for a number of years, ever since international trade as a share of world economic output began to decline. Now, however, CEOs and other top executives are really worried about how to respond to the rising levels of protectionist sentiment and the apparent trend in actual government policies towards protectionism.

Stephen D. King, the chief economist of HSBC, discusses deglobalization in a new book on the future of the global economy. King notes that we are in a very different historical epoch than the sunlit uplands of the 1990s, when globalization appeared unstoppable and public intellectuals announced the end of history and great power conflict. King sees a pattern that others have observed, namely that we are going back to an era of protectionism, nationalism, and  ethno-religious tensions similar to that of the interwar period of the 1920s and 1930s.  As a senior executive at a corporation that embodies the multicultural, multiracial global financial capitalism that emerged at the end of the twentieth century, King has very good reasons to be worried about deglobalization.  A similar historical analogy was used by Ruchir Sharma, Morgan Stanley’s chief global strategist in December 2016, although Sharma observed that today’s deglobalization  is somewhat different from the deglobalization of the interwar period .

 

It seems to me that mainstream strategy literature doesn’t appear to offer much guidance to managers seeking to formulate strategies to cope with the new phenomenon. Perhaps that’s because strategy professors haven’t yet had a chance to think about managerial responses to the newly discovered phenomenon.  Similarly, political science doesn’t  seem to offer a lot of practical advice to decision-makers in the private sector.  Michael Witt is a first-class political science/IR professor who teaches at INSEAD business school. If any political scientist could help executives to deal with deglobalization, it would be him.

Late last year,  Dr Witt wrote two pieces in which he pondered what deglobalization means for multinational firms. His first piece did an admirable job of summarizing the political science literature on globalization and deglobalization and tells people how two of the three main schools of thought in IR (Realism and Liberalism) view these phenomena. Somewhat curiously, Witt doesn’t say much as about Constructivism, another interpretative tradition in IR, which is unfortunate since constructivism has a great deal  to offer here. Anyway,  his second piece, which was published a week after the first one, sought to offer concrete advice to business executives interested in this topic. Sadly, the main pieces of managerial advice he provided weren’t that useful to managers.

Let me justify that assessment. Witt says that Liberal IR theory argues that  deglobalization is driven by rising inequality, which caused an upsurge of populist, anti-globalization sentiment from the parts of the electorate that have suffered from globalization.  Witt says that if firms wanted to continue doing business across borders, they need to shore up the political foundations of globalization by accepting a more progressive form of taxation. (Similar sentiments were heard from CEOs the January 2017 gathering in Davos).  Witt also argues recommends that  “longer-term investment plans should probably involve scenario planning”  that takes the re-imposition of tariffs into account.

The second piece of advice is sound and common-sensical, but the suggestion that senior executives do more to combat inequality  isn’t really practical, since a single CEO would be unable to combat rising inequality in their home country, unless that country happened to be very small and their firm was a major employer. There is a sort of free rider problem—if a CEO increases the wages his firm pays and no other firm follows suit, the CEO will have added to his costs without having done much to change the overall level of inequality in the country. A CEO operating in a corporate system dominated by Shareholder Value Ideology has very limited freedom to act.  That’s the problem with the argument that the left-wing venture capital Nick Hanauer made, when he said that CEOs who are worried about Trump’s protectionism should simply have paid their workers more.

It seems to me that Constructivist IR and, especially, my own home discipline of Business History could offer more useful advice to the makers of MNE strategy at this junction. (Business History informed by Constructivist IR could be a very powerful tool indeed).

The Constructivist approach to IR and International Political Economy (IPE) stresses that nations make policy in a cultural context that shapes how contemporaries view their self-interest. In other words, cultural differences such as gender ideologies, racial, religious, and ethno-national identities need to be taken into account. Deglobalization, both historically and in the present, appears to be associated with the rise in ethno-nationalist sentiment and growing hostility to the perceived other. While no single firm can reverse a pronounced trend in the culture towards  greater intolerance towards the Other, a group of firms, working together, can help to limit the spread of ethno-nationalist ideologies. For instance, they could do so by agreeing not to advertise on websites that promote the alt-right mentality that is congruent with tariff protectionism (see here).

Business history provides even more concrete advice. As business and economic historians know, deglobalization has happened before, most famously with the outbreak of the First World War. We can look to see how firms at the time handled deglobalization. Business historians have shown that a classic response to the imposition of tariff barriers is for firms to create local manufacturing subsidiaries within foreign nations.

There are other lessons about how to deal with deglobalization that managers can take from the historical record.    In a paper I published in an international-business journal, I discussed how the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation dealt with the First World War, a crisis that had the potential to destroy the corporation. HSBC, which was founded in 1865 and which had a multinational shareholder base and board of directors on the eve of the First World War, embodied that the open and cosmopolitan capitalism of the late nineteenth century, an era that was marked by falling trade barriers and increasing interconnectedness. HSBC was able to survive the First World War by paying close attention to the state of public opinion in Britain, which became increasingly xenophobic, and by severing ties to its German shareholders, directors and customers and by purging its executive workforce of a prominent individual of German-Jewish ancestry. HSBC was a much less profitable firm at the end of the conflict, but unlike many of the international banks in existence in August 1914, it survived the war. My paper aimed to use the historical experience of HSBC in war to identify lessons for the managers of present-day firms confronted with war and other drivers of deglobalization. One of these  lessons for present day managers is that conserving political capital in periods of heightened tensions between nations or other imagined communities may require the ruthless termination of relationships with people who are associated with the Other, at least insofar as the law of the land permits. (Note that I’m not saying that such a strategy would be morally right, just that it has worked in the past for firms). Another lesson that wartime managers could take from my paper on HSBC in WWI is that preserving legitimacy in the home country requires the head office to exert more control over overseas managers, less they embarrass the MNE in the home country, than would be the case in a time of generally good international relations.

There are important lessons for managers in the edited collection on the impact of the First World War on firm strategy was released by Routledge.  This book brought together the research of a business historians who use corporate archives. It is a common place among economic historians and historians of globalization to say that First World War end a long period of globalization and initiated a long period of deglobalization that that continued until after 1945. The edited collection was intended to help explore how firms confronted with a radical change in their operating environment responded. The papers in the collected documented a range of creative managerial responses to the First World War and its aftermath that included the creation of trans-national interfirm research alliances (see the paper by McGlade),  the adoption of new legal forms for companies (see the paper by Hannah), and the adoption of new management techniques in France and the UK (the chapter by Boyns). Studying how firms responded to sudden and dramatic change in the geopolitical environment in 1914 has the potential to offer lessons to the managers of today’s multinational firms.

 

 

 

 

 





Commonwealth Trade and the Brexiteer Imagination

25 03 2017

empiregoods.jpg

In previous blog posts, I have discussed how the Commonwealth looms large in the imagination of many advocates of Brexit.  The coalition that supports Brexit is, of course a diverse one that included libertarian millionaires to hard-core leftists who see the EU as a capitalist plot. However, one important strand of the pro-Brexit thought holds that when Britain joined the European Economic Community in 1973, it was severing its historic ties to the economies of the Commonwealth. People in this camp seem to think once Britain leaves the EU, it will be easy for the country to capitalise on the goodwill that exists towards Britain in the Commonwealth by negotiation free trade agreements with these nations, some of which have large and fast-growing economies.  As I and other commentators noted before the referendum, whenever people on the right-wing of the Conservative Party mention Brexit, the word “Commonwealth” is never far behind (see here).

For the time being, I will leave aside the issue of whether there is actually much goodwill towards Britain in the countries of the New Commonwealth, as opposed to the Old Dominions, where most of the population is of British stock. I’ll also leave aside the issue of whether it is possible for Britain to have strong ties with both the Commonwealth and the EU: the fact that Winston Churchill fought to preserve the British Empire and advocated the creation of a United States of Europe suggests that ties to the two blocs are not mutually exclusive. I’ll also leave aside the question of whether it is worth sacrificing the access the UK has to nearby access in the hopes of negotiation potential trade deals with distant markets. Instead, I will direct your attention to an excellent recent piece on Vox.Eu on the 1930s, when Britain and the Commonwealth countries negotiated a series of deals designed to redirect trade so that it remained within the boundaries of the Empire-Commonwealth. In the piece, which summarizes a full-length paper, Alan de Bromhead, Alan Fernihough, Markus Lampe, and Kevin O’Rourke shows that the protectionist trade policies introduced in the wake of the 1931 Ottawa Economic conference did indeed help to redirect British trade towards Commonwealth countries and away from foreign countries , including its neighbours in continental Europe. The authors conclude that tariff policy matters a great deal more than earlier economic-historical research had suggested. Earlier studies had suggested that the policies implemented after 1931 were not responsible for the shift in British trade towards Commonwealth countries and that other variables explain the shifts.  The new research shows that trade policies mattered more then and likely is more important as a determinant of international trade patterns in the present than we used to think.

So what is the significance of this research to the ongoing debate about the likely impact of a hard Brexit on intra-EU trade?  If trade policy matters more than previous thought, it suggests that a hard Brexit would have more implications for firms than some appear to believe.

 

One school of thought I have encountered recent goes like this: “Sure a hard Brexit in which we leave the Single Market isn’t ideal, but it’s not going to affect trade too much. Trade policy does affect trade that much- our trade pattern is pretty much a function of underlying fundamentals. For the last 200 years, the UK had done about half of its peacetime trade with Europe and about half with the outside world and that’s just dictated by geography.  Trade policy and membership in the Single Market can move the needle a little bit, but overall isn’t doesn’t matter. Therefore, relatively little trade with the created or destroyed by the distortions that would result from a change in trade policy.”

The new research shows why this seemingly plausibly line of reasoning, which I’ve heard from many smart people, doesn’t really work. A great deal of money at stake here and we need therefore need to redouble our efforts to ensure that the UK remains in the Single Market, or at least the Customs Union.

 





Funded PhD Position: The Making of a Lopsided Union: Economic Integration in the European Economic Community, 1957-1992

24 03 2017

Two 3-year fully funded PhD Scholarships

to be held at the University of Glasgow from September 2017

 

Applications are invited for two 3-year PhD scholarships (with a possibility of a one-year extension) in Economic and Social History at the University of Glasgow.

 

The successful candidates will be part of the ERC-funded project The Making of a Lopsided Union: Economic Integration in the European Economic Community, 1957-1992 (EURECON) led by Dr Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol. They are expected to begin on 1 September 2017, or as soon as possible thereafter.

 

Description of the EURECON project

 

The goal of EURECON is to explore European policymakers’ views about how to make the organisation of the European Economic Community (EEC) fit for the creation of a single currency, from 1957 to 1992. It is often said that the euro has faults of conception. But how did this happen? How was the euro made in such a way that it nearly completely overlooked some critical aspects of monetary unions? The assumption is that in the run-up to the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, European policymakers just did not think properly about how to make the Euro work. Was this really the case? Did European policymakers really overlook the economic foundations of European monetary union?

 

The project aims to examine European policymakers’ debates and proposals, understand the reasons for their success or failure, identify the dynamics of political and economic trade-offs and compromises, shifting priorities, and alternative approaches that were abandoned at the time but recycled later. The project focuses on five work packages: macroeconomic policy coordination, fiscal transfers, capital market integration, banking harmonisation/supervision and the deepening of the common/single market. The project will examine the origins of the issues that are currently bedevilling the European Union (EU) by investigating the period between the creation of the EEC in 1957 and the decision to create a European single currency in 1992.

 

PhD positions

 

The PhD projects will focus on the role and influence of non-state, non-EEC actors and factors in the above discussions. Interested applicants should focus specifically on the role of one of the following actors/factor:

 

  • Commercial banks: Commercial banks were central actors in the development of European economic integration, in particular with regard to capital market integration, regulation/supervision, and the development of the common/single market. Did they support the creation of a common market in banking? Did they adopt specific lobbying strategies within their respective member states and in Brussels? How did they view the possible future creation of a monetary union in Europe?

 

  • Big business (other than banks): The implementation of the common/single market, the issue of EEC fiscal transfers, and macroeconomic policy coordination had an impact on the conduct of business in Europe. Did big business consider that these developments would improve their environment, in creating more business opportunities, easier financing and trade? The Roundtable of Industrialists famously lobbied for the Single Market Project; did big business aim to actively support or oppose other developments at different time periods?

 

  • Trade unions: Macroeconomic policy coordination, EEC fiscal transfers, and the development of the common/single market had an important impact upon labour relations. How did trade unions try to influence European economic policymaking? In particular, how did they promote European social policies and how did they cope with the challenges induced by European economic integration in a globalising world? The rise of unemployment in Europe from the 1970s as well as the reflections mentioned above about the introduction of an EEC-wide unemployment benefit provided an important points of interest for trade unions.

 

  • The spread and influence of economic ideas on the evolution of European economic cooperation and integration: Many economic ideas have influenced and competed over the development of European economic integration, including German ordo-liberalism, French planning, and neo-liberalism. Recent studies have shed light on the rise of neo-liberal politics in the evolution of thinking about deregulation and the free movement of capital. How did economic thinking evolve in the EEC and how did these influences permeate policymaking at the European level? This topic would more specifically focus on the intellectual history dimension of the economic integration of Europe by looking at one of these schools of thought. How did these ideas spread among European policymakers? How did these ideas change over time? What was their actual influence?

 

The successful candidate is expected to:

  • Write a PhD thesis under the supervision of Dr Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol
  • Be an active part of the EURECON project and work in close cooperation with other team members
  • Present papers at conferences
  • Publish in international peer-reviewed journals (individual and co-authored)
  • Participate in yearly workshops organised within the scope of EURECON.

 

The successful candidate will register for a PhD in Economic and Social History, School of Social and Political Sciences, College of Social Sciences, University of Glasgow.

 

The scholarship covers the successful student’s full-time home/EU tuition fees (£4,121 p.a. for 2016/17), pays a stipend (£14,296 p.a. for 2016/17), and includes a research budget allowance to cover expenses related to archival research and conference attendance (at least £1500 p.a.). There is a possibility for an extension to a fourth year, under the same financial conditions.

 

PhD students at the University of Glasgow benefit from the College of Social Sciences’ Graduate School Research Training Programme, as well as an annual Thesis Review Committee and an annual Doctoral Retreat. PhD students may also have the opportunity to become Graduate Teaching Assistants and gain teaching experience.

 

Candidates must be fluent in English. A good command of another European language would be an advantage.

 

How to apply

 

Please include the following supporting documentation with your application:

  • Your CV
  • Your research proposal focusing on one of the actors/factors outlined above (max. 2500 words, including footnotes, references and bibliography)
  • Your degree transcripts
  • Your English language certificate
  • Two letters of reference

 

Interested candidates should apply on the University of Glasgow’s Online Application System http://www.gla.ac.uk/research/opportunities/howtoapplyforaresearchdegree/#/. Applicants should put ‘EURECON’ in the ‘Research Title’ field in ‘Step 6 – Course Details’ of the application form, and select ‘PhD in Economic and Social History (Research)’.

 

Interested applicants are strongly advised to discuss their research proposal with Dr Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol (emmanuel.mourlon-druol@glasgow.ac.uk) before they apply.

 

Short-listed candidates may be invited for an interview in Glasgow.
Application deadline is 7 May 2017.





CFP: Methodological Debates in Management History

21 03 2017

Use of Methodology in Management History
Special issue call for papers from Journal of Management History

Guest Editors:
Wim van Lent, Montpellier Business School
Gabrielle Durepos, Mount Saint Vincent University

Submission deadline: 1 February 2018

Background

Ever since the “historical turn” in organisation studies (Clark and Rowlinson 2004), the importance of history to understanding organisations and institutions has been increasingly recognized (e.g. Sydow, Schreyogg and Koch 2009, Ocasio, Mauskapf and Steele 2015, Suddaby 2016, Durepos and Mills 2012). Since history provides an alternative to the dominant science paradigms in organisation studies (Zald 1993), studies using a historical approach are contributing to and even shaping a growing number of scholarly debates (Decker, Kipping and Wadhwani 2015). The growing appreciation of historical approaches to building and testing organisation theory has spawned a body of work on how to engage in historical analysis with the specific aim of bridging the gap between the historical and organisational scientific communities (e.g. Rowlinson, Hassard and Decker 2014, De Jong, Higgins and Van Driel 2015, Whittle and Wilson 2015, Suddaby 2016, Durepos 2015). The fundamental insight that emerges from it is that history is no less fragmented than organisational theory (Rowlinson et al. 2014: 269). According to Bowden (2016), management scholars are essentially divided along a continuum with on the one extreme De Jong et al.’s (2015) position that history should be empirical and theory-oriented, and on the other extreme Whittle and Wilson’s (2015) “ethnomethodological” perspective, which is rooted in postmodernism and takes a more critical perspective on history-writing. Scholars find themselves either on the continuum with genealogy (Decker et al. 2015) and rhetorical history (Suddaby, Foster and Quinn Trank 2010) and even beyond with ANTi-History (Durepos and Mills 2012, 2017).

Although methodological diversity could impede moving the field forward, the variety that they encompass comes with potential, for example in terms of diversity of research questions and richness of historical knowledge (Decker et al. 2015). Fortunately, the conditions for the further development of management history (also in relation to other fields) seem to be in place: despite history’s growing permeation of organisation studies, there is still a lot of evidence enclosed in corporate archives with which management historians can formulate novel insights into the working of organisations and institutions (Rowlinson et al. 2014, Mills and Helms Mills 2017). However, in order to fully realize this potential, management history will have to go beyond “merely” continuing the proliferation of research using alternative types of historical data and analysis. Most importantly, research should be multidisciplinary (Bucheli and Wadhwani 2014), connecting an understanding of organisational theory and methods with historical contexts and source material (Rowlinson et al. 2014), or involving multiple sources and methods for data analysis (Bowden 2016). In addition, since histories are not uncontested records, management history is greatly helped by methodological reflexivity (Rowlinson et al. 2014). That is, when researchers are aware of their role in selecting certain traces over others, what their sources cover, and how and why they were put together, as well as the shaping influence of the historical context within which they construct theoretical arguments, they may improve the plausibility of their analyses and better identify scope conditions (Bowden 2016).

Aims and Scope

This special issue has two broad purposes: 1) to move forward the methodological debates in management history and 2) to demonstrate the use of / refine historical methods in organisational research through empirical analysis. We therefore welcome both theoretical and empirical papers. Below we suggest a non-exhaustive list of specific topics that contribute to the above two goals. Papers focusing on topics that are not included but sufficiently related to the goals highlighted above would also be welcome as submissions to the special issue.

• Epistemology and management history
• Typification of research methodologies
• Novel research methods in management history
• Ways in which different methods can be combined for richer empirical insights
• Empirical demonstrations of the use of one or several methodologies
• Methodological refinement through empirical analysis
• Benefits / drawbacks of research methods for a management history audience

Submission Process

Submitted papers must conform to the submission guidelines of the Journal of Management History. Manuscripts are due by 1 February 2018 and must be submitted using the JMH submission system at https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jmh. Authors should indicate that they would like their document to be considered for the special issue “Uses of Methodology in Management History”. Authors of papers invited to be revised and resubmitted will be expected to work within a tight timeframe for revisions.

Further information
Questions pertaining to this special issue may be directed to:
• Wim van Lent (w.vanlent@montpellier-bs.com)
• Gabrielle Durepos (gabrielle.durepos@msvu.ca)
• Bradley Bowden (b.bowden@griffith.edu.au)

For questions about submitting to the special issue contact the JMH Publisher, Patti Davis (pdavis@emeraldinsight.com).

References

Bowden, B (2016) Editorial and note on the writing of management history. Journal of Management History, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 118-129.
Bucheli M and Wadhwani D (2014) Organizations in time: history, theory, methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Clark P and Rowlinson M (2004) The treatment of history in organisation studies: toward an “historic turn”? Business History, Vol. 46, No. 3, pp. 331-352.
De Jong A, Higgins DM and Van Driel H (2015) Towards a new business history? Business History, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 5-29.
Decker S, Kipping M and Wadhwani D (2015) New business histories! Plurality in business history research methods. Business History, Vol. 57, No.1, pp. 30-40.
Durepos G (2015) ANTi-history: Toward amodern histories, in P Genoe McLaren, AJ Mills and T Weatherbee (Eds.), The Routledge companion to management and organisational history (pp. 153-180). New York: Routledge.
Durepos G and Mills A (2012) ANTi-history: Theorizing the past, history, and
historiography in management and organizational studies. Charlotte, NC:
Information Age Publishing.
Durepos G and Mills A (In press, 2017) ANTi-history: An alternative approach to historiography, in C Cassell, A Cunliffe and G Grandy (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of qualitative business and management research methods. London: Sage.
Mills A and Helms Mills J (In press, 2017) Archival research, in C Cassell, A Cunliffe and G Grandy (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of qualitative business and management research methods. London: SAGE.
Ocasio W, Mauskapf M and Steele CWJ (2016) History, society, and institutions: the role of collective memory in the emergence and evolution of societal logics, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 41, No. 4, pp. 676-699.
Rowlinson M, Hassard J and Decker S (2014) Research strategies for organisational history: a dialogue between historical theory and organization theory, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 250-274.
Suddaby R (2016) Toward a historical consciousness: following the historic turn in management thought, M@n@gement, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 46-60.
Suddaby R, Foster W and Quinn Trank C (2010) Rhetorical history as a source of competitive advantage, Advances in Strategic Management, Vol. 27, pp. 147-173.
Sydow J, Schreyögg G and Koch J (2009) Organisational path dependence: opening the black box, Academy of Management Review, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 689-709.
Whittle A and Wilson J (2015) Ethnomethodology and the production of history: studying ‘history-in-action’, Business History, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 41-63.
Zald M (1993) Organisation studies as a scientific and humanistic enterprise: towards a reconceptualization of the foundations of the field, Organisation Science, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 513-528.





An Evolutionary Economics Perspective on the Liverpool Timber Cluster, 1810-1913

21 03 2017
canada dock
Next week, I will be presenting at the Business History Conference in Denver, Colorado. The research I’ll be presenting was funded by a Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada Insight Development Grant. The title of the project is Empire, Trees, and Climate in the North Atlantic: Towards Critical Dendro-Provenancing.
The co-authors of my paper are: Kirsten Greer (Canada Research Chair in Global Environmental Histories and Geographies, Nipissing University), Kirby Calvert (Department of Geography, University of Guelph).

Abstract

Abstract: This paper uses theoretical insights derived from Evolutionary Economic Geography (EEG) to relate the experience of Liverpool’s timber cluster to ongoing debates about the merits of various types of mercantilist tariff policies. In 1810, the British government introduced a tariff policy designed to create alternative to Britain’s traditional supplies of wood in the Baltic region. The policy consisted of discriminatory duties to incentivize timber importing firms to switch from their traditional suppliers in the Baltic to more Canadian sources of wood. As we show below, this policy, combined with the spatial and material nature of the timber trade, shaped the kinds of knowledge acquired by Liverpool firms during and after the ‘stimulus period’. This knowledge included greater geographical awareness, knowledge of how to manage vertically-integrated international timber enterprise, knowledge of non-European timber, and knowledge of how to cooperate together politically. After the stimulus policy was dismantled starting in 1842, these new sources of knowledge were leveraged by Liverpool timber merchants to preserve their competitive advantage.

 

On a practical level, this historical research speaks to contemporary concerns about how governments can use tariff policy and other interventions in the economy to encourage the development of competitive capabilities by clusters. Our paper suggests that tariffs and other interventions are more likely to promote competitive advantage by a cluster if there is a so-called “anchor” present. This work therefore speaks to EEG scholars who are increasingly interested in the role of “anchors” in the development of clusters. They theorize that the development of competitive capabilities within a cluster is likely to take place if the local institutions include an “anchor” that serve to share knowledge within the locality. In modern economies, such anchors range from universities to independent record stores (Hauge and Hracs, 2010; Hracs and Jansson, 2016). In the Liverpool timber cluster, the key anchor was the firm of Edward Chaloner, which generously shared its knowledge of tropical woods with other firms in the clusters, thereby helping to make Liverpool into a great centre for trade in mahogany and other New World tropical timbers.

 

The research presented in this paper was financed by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada under the following Insight Development programme project: Empire, Timber, Climate: Empire, Trees, and Climate in the North Atlantic: Towards Critical Dendro-Provenancing. The international trade dataset on which this paper draws will soon be downloaded as an Excel file from the Empire Timber project website.

 

SSHRC-CRSH_FIP





Historical Perspectives on Populism and Financial Markets

17 03 2017
Triton-Haus, Frankfurt, West view

Allianz Global Investors HQ, Frankfurt Image Source: Wikimedia Commons  Von DXR – Eigenes Werk, CC-BY-SA 4.0,

I’m sharing some information about a great initiative of the European Association for Banking  History, which is running a special lunch-hour event in Frankfurt designed the illustrate the relevance to the present of business-historical research. The event will be run in cooperation with Allianz Global Investors GmbH and will take place at their headquarters.
Tue, 25 April, 12 am
Frankfurt am Main, Germany
This talk will initiate a series of presentations that present analysis of the different episodes of populism in recent history as well as their effect on financial markets and investment returns.
  • Manuel Funke (Freie Universität Berlin), Stefan Hofrichter (AllianzGI), Moritz Schularick (University of Bonn) and Christoph Trebesch (Kiel Institute for the World Economy) bring a brand new perspective that goes beyond the political dimension in how to successfully deal with populism and the connected risks.
Just about three months after Donald Trump took office and with elections in France looming, there could not be a more timely moment for this discussion.
Discussion with the audience is planned and all participants are kindly invited to join the discussants for a networking lunch. 
Register here.




My Panel at the BHC 2017

13 03 2017

I’m looking forward the Business History Conference in Denver, Colorado. Here are the details of my panel.

 

A Commodity Cartels
Location TBA
Chair: Richard John, Columbia University
Discussant: Espen Storli, Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Andrew D. Smith, University of Liverpool Management School
“An Evolutionary Economics Perspective on the Liverpool Timber Cluster, 1810-1913”

Elina Kuorelahti, University of Helsinki
“Small States, Big Risks: Nordic Diplomacy and the European Timber Cartel in the 1930s”

Malin Dahlström, University of Gothenburg
“The European Cement Cartel–A Swedish Cartel?”