CFP: The Business of Slavery

7 11 2013

17-19 September 2014, University of Nottingham, UK

An interdisciplinary conference co-hosted by the Centre for Economic and Business History and the Institute for the Study of Slavery, University of Nottingham, UK

Call for Papers        

Formerly enslaved persons and others forced to provide their labour have always made, and continue to make, an invaluable contribution to the economies of various societies; whether that be collectively through their labour efforts in a slave society, through the state, merchants, and others buying and selling their bodies, through contributions to households or small businesses, or through their independent efforts to sell their labour with the aim of freeing themselves.

This interdisciplinary conference will be co-hosted by the Centre for Economic and Business History and the Institute for the Study of Slavery. It aims to bring together assessments of the contributions of enslaved people to the economy of different eras and societies and from various perspectives, including the wider economy, the slave traders, the slave holders and the slaves themselves. It will compare these assessments over chronological eras and in societies around the globe. Papers are invited which discuss themes as diverse  as (but which are not restricted to); slave trading (including foreign and indigenous trades, legal and illegal trades), the economies of slave societies, the economies of the slaves themselves, (including hiring out), the use of slaves by freedmen and freedwomen, serfdom, debt bondage, prostitution, forced (including child) labour,  and from chronological periods as diverse as Ancient Greece and Rome, Medieval Europe, the early-modern Barbary States, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, and the modern world.

We will welcome proposals for papers based on textual and non-textual sources, and from any discipline. Proposals for single papers, complete panels and round tables are welcome (please provide a cover sheet with rationale for a panel or round table. Postgraduates are of course welcome and may display a poster if they prefer. We are hoping to get some funding for bursaries for postgraduates.

The conference will be held at National College for Teaching and Leadership, Jubilee Campus, University of Nottingham, 17-19 September 2014.

Closing date for proposals:  24th March 2014.

Please send proposals to Sheryllynne Haggerty, at sheryllynne.haggerty (at) nottingham.ac.uk





100 Years of the Fed

6 11 2013

The public loves anniversaries. For historians interested in disseminating their research to people outside of the academy, anniversaries are “teachable moments.” The centenary of the Federal Reserve, which was created in 1913, is certainly turning into such an occasion.  For instance, the Cato Institute’s blog will be hosting a discussion this month about the Fed’s performance over the century.  This discussion at Cato Unbound has already begun with a lead essay by Gerald P. O’Driscoll. The blog will soon post Reaction Essays by Lawrence H. White (6 November); Scott Sumner (8 November), and Jerry L. Jordan (11 November).

 

All of these authors are libertarian, which is to be expected, since it is a Cato blog after all. I was, however, disappointed by the fact that none of these four authors are economic historians or historians. Perhaps Cato could have tried harder to find a libertarian historian or political scientist capable of writing about this topic.  Doing so would have injected a more interdisciplinary element to the discussion.

 

Richard E. Sylla, Henry Kaufman Professor of the History of Financial Institutions and Markets at New York University’s Stern School of Business,  has recently released a list of the top six leaders in the history of the Fed.  Sylla’s list includes William G. McAdoo,  Benjamin Strong, Marriner Stoddard Eccles, William McChesney Martin, Jr., Paul A. Volcker, and, of course, Alan Greenspan.

 

Benjamin Strong

Personally, I think that Strong was the most important of these individuals. Strong had a very good working relations with his counterparts in the world’s other major central banks. (He was very close to Montagu Norman at the Bank of England).

As Liaquat Ahamed has demonstrated in a recent work of popular history, Strong’s untimely death in 1928 created a vacuum and made  it difficult to coordinate an international response to the bank failures that followed the Crash of 1929. Although there are dangers in attributing too much importance to individuals in financial history, or indeed any branch of history, I think one can support the thesis that Strong was an important player and that his premature death had a greater social impact than, say, the death of Warren Harding.





Interview with the Author of _Investing in Life: Insurance in Antebellum America_

6 11 2013

I recently discovered a podcast  in which historian Sharon Ann Murphy discusses her new book on the development of the life insurance industry in the United States before the Civil War.  Investing in Life: Insurance in Antebellum America (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010; paperback, 2013) describes ” the creation and expansion of the American life insurance industry from its early origins in the 1810s through the 1860s and examines how its growth paralleled and influenced the emergence of the middle class.” The book deals with issues such as gender, slavery, and the rise of statistical thinking.





Conference on Ronald Coase and His Times

5 11 2013

AS: As readers of this blog will know, the great economist Ronald Coase (1910-2013) died  earlier this year. To learn more about this important contributions to economics and economic history, listen to this recent podcast.  In the podcast, Don Boudreaux of George Mason University chats with Russ Roberts about Coase’s four key publications. Coase, who completed his graduate education at LSE in the early 1930s, was arguably the last of the great literary economists: Coase’s articles were beautifully written and contained relatively few numbers, which made them accessible to a wide range of people. 

Coase formulated his famous theory of the firm while he was working at the newly founded Dundee School of Economics and Commerce in the 1930s.  The School, which is now part of the University of Dundee, is hosting a conference this month at which scholars will present a papers in which they seek to place Coase in his immediate historical context.  Judging from its title, Carlo Morelli’s paper will assess whether Coase’s theory of the firm was based on his observations of Dundee’s jute industry

Dundee

Dundee

Morelli’s paper appears to contradict a statement about the inspiration for Coase’s 1937 paper on the Nature of the Firm that Russ Roberts made in the aforementioned podcast.  In the podcast, Dr Roberts stated that the paper

 grew out of a trip that Coase had made, with a fellow student I believe, to the United States, a research trip. He was a student at the London School of Economics (LSE), where he encountered Friedrich Hayek; Hayek was one of his professors. His main professor was Arnold Plant. Arnold Plant was very interested in accounting and did some work in the economics of accounting. As did Coase. Coase got a fellowship in the early 1930s to the United States, and he studied actual business organization. At some point it dawned on him that the way economists talk about the firm, the firm is a black box. To this day we don’t really talk about what goes on inside the firm. 

I know this is a small point, but it seemed worthy of mention.

The Dundee Jute Industry In Its Prime

Anyway, here are the details of the conference.

The University of Dundee’s Scottish Centre for Economic Methodology is hosting a conference 18 November 2013, “Origins of the Theory of the Firm: Ronald Coase at Dundee, 1932-1934.” The program looks really interesting:

  • Keith Tribe, “Dundee and Interwar Commercial Education.”
  • Billy Kenefick, “‘A great industrial cul-de-sac, a grim monument to “man’s inhumanity to man.” ‘ Dundee by the early 1930s.”
  • Carlo Morelli, “Market & Non-Market Co-ordination: Dundee and its Jute Industry – The Case Study for Ronald Coase?”
  • David Campbell, “Agency, Authority and Co-operation in the Firm: Coase, Macneil, Marx.”
  • Alice Belcher, “Coase and the Concept of Direction: How Valuable are Legal Concepts in the Theory of the Firm?”
  • Brian Loasby, “Ronald Coase’s Theory of the Firm and the Scope of Economics.”
  • Alistair Dow & Sheila Dow, “Coase and Scottish Political Economy.”
  • Eyup Ozveren & Ilhan Can Ozen, “Coase versus Coase: What if the Market Were One Big Firm Instead?”
  • Neil Kay, “Coase, The Nature of the Firm, and the Principles of Marginal Analysis.”

Hat tip to Peter Klein.

P.S. Coase briefly taught at the University of Liverpool, my new employer.





1825 vs 2008

1 11 2013

Financial historian John Turner has published a great blog post comparing the lacklustre response of policymakers to the 2008 financial crisis to the bold reforms Britain imposed in the aftermath of the 1825-6 banking crisis.

Speaking of the Lehman Brothers crisis, Turner remarks that

To find a British banking crisis of comparable magnitude we must go back as far as 1825. The UK has actually suffered surprisingly little banking instability in the intervening years. Even events which historians have traditionally classified as banking crises pale into insignificance when compared with the devastation of the 1820s.

Turner points out that effects on the real economy of the 1825-6 crisis were similar to that of the Lehman Brothers collapse. “GDP fell by more than 5.9% in 1826, a figure not dissimilar to the collapse in UK GDP in the year following the Lehman debacle.”

Note Issued By One of the Banks Affected by the 1825 Crisis

The government of Lord Liverpool acted quickly, decisively and radically in 1826. But the governments of Gordon Brown and David Cameron have acted slowly, indecisively and conservatively whenever it has come to the reform of the banking system. Despite parliamentary enquiries, the Independent Commission on Banking and the Turner Review, we have not seen a radical reform of the banking system; rather we have witnessed a tinkering with the pre-crisis regulatory regime.

 

The 1826 legislation resulted in stable banking as bank shareholders were unlimitedly liable for their bank’s debts. This constrained banks from taking excessive risk. After the global financial crisis of 2008, there has been no radical reform of banking and no attempt to make shareholders have more “skin the game” in the form of substantially higher capital, which would act as a check on excessive risk taking.

In my view, to understand the why governments in Britain, the United States, and other countries have failed to implement the obviously remedy (i.e., increasing the capital requirement for banks and forcing key players to have “more skin in the game”) we need to draw on public choice theory. To put it more bluntly, we need to ensure that there aren’t corrupt ties between the banks and the regulators. There is a revolving door connecting the regulators and the banks.

I recommend that everyone interested in this issue have a look at  Anat R. Admati and Martin F. Hellwig. The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s Wrong with Banking and What to Do About It. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013. There was a recent EconTalk podcast that deals with this issue as well.

Here’s some speculation: Lord Liverpool’s administration was able to implement banking reform because its key personnel were landed aristocrats who weren’t expecting to get jobs with JPMorganChase after they left office.





Christopher Moore on the Senator From Bay Street

31 10 2013

Historian and blogger Christopher Moore has published some great comments about my recent post on the relationship between business and the Canadian Senate. He wrote that:

Andrew’s evidence and argument are interesting — particularly when, in acknowledging there was never going to be a Canadian class equivalent to the British aristocracy of the mid-19th century, he considers how the senate may have come to represent the Canadian business class. 

I suspect the way to pursue this question might be to investigate the careers of men like Salter Hayden, a Toronto lawyer appointed by Mackenzie King in 1940 who as chair of the Senate Banking Committee functioned as the Senator from Bay Street until his retirement in 1983. Careers like his suggest how the Senate still lacked power but had influence, as a kind of lobbyists’ chamber. But with the imposition of party discipline on the Senate and the appointment of party functionaries like Keith Davey and publicists like Duffy and Wallin, even that role seems to have shrunk in recent decades.

 

Bay Street

For the benefit of non-Canadian readers, I should add that the metonym “Bay Street” is used in Canada to refer to Big Business, Bay Street being in Toronto’s financial district. The reference to Hayden is a great one. Hayden served in Canada’s unelected upper house for an incredibly long period, 1940–1983, that happened to coincide with the peak of the interventionist-Keynesian-social democratic state in Canada. Hayden advanced the interests of a variety of powerful interest groups, such as dairy farmers: he was partially responsible for the Canadian government’s prohibition of margarine.

Sadly, there is no biography of Hayden. Chris has added to the list of important books that are not yet written.





My Presentation at St Antony’s College Oxford, 4 November 2013

31 10 2013

I’m going to be presenting a paper entitled  “In the Shadow of William Henry Seward: Relations Between Canada and the Caribbean in the 1860s” Monday, 4th November 5:00 – 6:30 PM in Pavilion Seminar Room, Gateway Buildings in St Antony’s College. (62 Woodstock Road).

 62 Woodstock Road Oxford

This paper examines what Canadian leaders thought about the non-white populations of the British West Indies and their future relationship with the British colonies in mainland North America.  In 1866, a group of prominent British North Americans were sent by the Fathers of Confederation to observe conditions in the West Indies and Brazil. Although ostensibly just about improving commercial relations,  the 1866 trade mission was a precursor of future Canadian proposals to annex all or part of the British West Indies.   Our paper places the Canadian 1866 mission paralleled William Henry Seward’s expansionist programme, the cancellation of the Canada-US Reciprocity Agreement [i.e., free trade],   the racial politics of contemporary North America, the 1865 Morant Bay rebellion in Jamaica, and the ongoing movement to federate the British colonies on the North American mainland. Our paper is based on correspondence in the Colonial Office files, Canadian archival materials, and newspapers.





Words, Numbers, Rationality: The effect of accounting systems and language on economic and business decision-making

31 10 2013

AS: The University of Reading, which is a noted centre for business-historical research, will be hosting a small conference on the history of accounting next week.  Places are still available and there is no charge to attend. For catering purposes, you should RSVP to bz483745@reading.ac.uk .

 

Friday 8 November 2013: Thet Win Aung Boardroom, RU Student Union

This interdisciplinary workshop, sponsored by the Centre for Economic History and the Economic History Society, will explore how, through the ages, language and recording systems employed at the time influenced concepts of economic rationality.

9.00 Coffee and registration

09:30 Mr M. Stringer (Reading) Sales, Costs and … Confusion? : Linguistic and accounting constraints on decision-making in Roman agriculture.

10:20 Dr A. Dobie (Stirling) Medieval Man, Accounting and Economic Rationalism.

11.00 Coffee break

11:30 Prof. R. Macve (LSE) A genealogy of myths about the rationality of accounting in the West and in the East.

12:10 Dr O. Gelderblom (Utrecht) The public support of private accounting as the key to understanding the commercial expansion of Europe before the Industrial Revolution.

13.00: Lunch break

14:15 Prof. G. Waymire (Emory) The Impact of hard information on self-dealing, soft communication, and social gains in an investment-trust game.

15:00 Prof. S. Basu (Temple) Knowledge, mental memory and accounting transaction records.

16:15 Round Table Discussion with M. Casson (Reading), K. Verboven (Ghent), D. Mullins (Oxford), and A. Marzano (Reading).





Constitutional Change and Canadian Business History

25 10 2013

The Canadian Senate

Yesterday, the Court of Appeal of the Province of Quebec ruled that the efforts of the Canadian federal government to convert the Upper House of the Canadian legislature into an elective body are unconstitutional because the federal government has not obtained the support of seven provinces with at least 50 percent of the country’s population. See press reaction here, here, and here.

The court’s ruling is a setback for Canada’s governing Conservative party. It also has implications for Canadian business historians and the study of the relationship between business and the State in Canadian history. I will get to the implications of this ruling for business historians in the second half of this blog post.  The court’s ruling contains a great deal of important and accurate historical material, much of which appears to be based on an expert witness opinion submitted earlier this year by Christopher Manfredi of McGill University.

For background, I should explain that Canada’s current government has been attempting to reform Canada’s unelected upper house, the Senate, by making it into an elective body.  For the benefit of non-Canadian readers, I should explain that the Canadian Senate was created in the 1867 to serve as a rough approximation of the British House of Lords. The 1867 constitution also created an elected House of Commons, which is where the real power in Canada lies.  The Canadian Senate has powers similar to that of the Irish Seanad.

The 1867 constitution required Senators to have at least $4,000 in real property in the province they represent. This provision is still in place, even though $4,000 buys far less land than it did in 1867. The Senate’s members are appointed by the Crown (i.e., the Prime Minister). Interestingly enough. 95% of them happen to belong to the same political party as the Prime Minister who appoints them.  As Quebec’s Court of Appeal noted in the judgement delivered yesterday, Canada experimented with an elected upper house in the 1850s and 1860s, but in 1867 it reverted to an British-style unelected upper chamber.

In the early 21st century, there is a consensus that something ought to be done about the Canadian Senate. Critics of the current Canadian federal government have charged that its Senate reform law amounts to a change to the 1867 constitution and that the federal government can’t make such drastic changes unilaterally: the Canadian constitution says the Senate can only be changed with the support of seven provincial legislatures (and the seven provinces in question have to have at least half of Canada’s population). This is the so-called 7/50 amending formula.

Earlier this year, the Canadian government released a document, a so-called factum, justifying its decision to reform the Senate without the support of the provincial governments.  This document  invokes the “Living Tree” doctrine of Canadian constitutional interpretation and says that Canadian Supreme Court should interpret the meaning of the constitution in a flexible way rather than strictly adhering to the wording of a document created nearly 150 years ago.

“Slavish adherence to original intent has been rejected by this Court in, for example, the Same Sex Marriage Reference, where the Court held that the understanding of ‘marriage’ that prevailed in 1867 should not be determinative of our present day understanding.”

That’s an interesting argument, especially since the 7/50  rule actually dates from 1982. The arguments in favour of the Living Tree approach to constitutional interpretation are strongest when we are considering constitutional texts produced in a society with radically different values than our own.  It is far less strong when we are talking about a section of the constitution that dates from 1982.

The federal government’s factum is a fascinating document and contains some interesting information about the history of the Canadian Senate.  However, there were some historical statements on pages 17-19 with which I disagree.  (This is the section called “The Senate at Confederation”). In fact, these historical statements were just plain wrong and I am very glad that the Quebec Court of Appeal rejected them and based its ruling on correct history.

Here are the historical statements that I don’t think are entirely accurate. I’m put the key sentences in bold. They relate to social class.

[Sir John A.] Macdonald accepted that the “constitution of the upper house should be in  accordance with the British system as nearly as circumstances would allow” a phrase  reflecting the general tone of the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867. However,  Macdonald envisioned a Senate that was not like the House of Lords. The members of the Senate were to be like those of the lower [House], men of the people and from the people.

Ok, so here the factum suggests that the Canadian Upper House was not intended to represent the interests of the upper classes in Canadian society. The problem with this claim is that there is a lot of evidence to suggest that the Canadian Senate was indeed intended to represent the upper classes: most Canadians in 1867 still thought about bicameral legislatures in terms of the representation of different social classes.  The lower chamber was intended to represent the commoners, the upper chamber the wealthy. Consider the evidence that is presented in the factum’s very next paragraph:

The method of selecting Senators was a matter of controversy. Macdonald
favoured an appointed Senate, rather than one with elected members; however, he
accepted that “the arguments for an elective council are numerous and strong” and that
the elected upper house in the united province of Canada “has not been a failure”. The
primary reason he favoured an appointed Senate was that the size of the constituencies
and the costs of mounting an election would deter “men of standing” from coming
forward.63 George Brown shared this concern, saying that ” … we must all feel that the
election of members for such enormous districts as form the constituencies of the upper
house has become a great practical inconvenience.,,64 A

What did Macdonald mean by “men of standing”? It is pretty clear from context that he was talking about men of property, or what Occupy Wall Street would now call the 1%.  The idea that Canada’s upper chambers should represent the upper classes died hard. Today, we tend to forget how undemocratic the ideas of nineteenth-century Canadians truly were.

In 1880, the Conservative politician François Xavier Anselme Trudel defended Quebec’s unelected upper house from the “advanced liberals” who wished to abolish it. Trudel, who was a member of the conservative ultramontane wing of the Catholic Church, said that having an unelected upper house to represent “les classes superieures” of Quebec was in keeping with the principles of the wider British Empire. He seems to have referring to the House of Lords here. Moreover, the institution reflected the eternal truth that God had divided men into two classes, the rich and the poor. He asked how could “les artisans, les laboureurs, les simples commercants” be equipped to legislate on

great matters of state? Such humble folk, he opined, should be content with their existing station in life rather than seek admission to the upper house.

As late as 1885, when Prime Minister Macdonald was working on a law to establish a uniform national property qualification for voters, he told his secretary Joseph Pope that he found the idea of votes for all adult males “repellent”. Indeed, he thought that no advocate of manhood suffrage deserved to call himself Conservative. Macdonald, who feared that the Liberal-dominated provincial legislatures might introduce manhood suffrage, regarded the 1885 national franchise law as one of his greatest accomplishments, a triumph similar in importance to the completion of the Pacific railway in that year and Confederation in 1867. Macdonald favoured votes for unmarried propertied women, but was not too upset when this feature of his bill was dropped due to backbencher pressure. The main thing, in his eyes, was that the property qualification for men had been preserved and extended to all corners of the Dominion.

All of this raises the question of why Canada’s upper house is named the Senate rather than the House of Lords. After all, Canada’s Senators are similar to Britain’s life peers.  The 72 Resolutions, the rough draft of the 1867 constitution produced by the Fathers of Confederation in 1864, did not specify what the name of Canada’s unelected upper house should be, although it did say that the elected lower chamber would be called the House of Commons. Arthur Hamilton Gordon, the Lt Governor of New Brunnswick explained why they did this in a letter to Edward Cardwell, the British Colonial Secretary in a letter dated 5 December 1864.

“There is one point which I wish you would consider, though your first inclination will be to laugh. The Confederate lower house is to be the House of Commons—the delegates have been afraid themselves to give a name to the Upper House, but would gladly see conferred on it a title which would make a seat in it more coveted. An hereditary peerage is, of course, here impossible, but it is very desirable that the members of the Upper House of the British America should have some more distinctive title than that of “Honble”which they share with every member of every petty State legislature in the US and every office holder and ex office holder in these provinces; and I can see no reason why they should not like the Scotch Judges have the title of Lord for Life.  It would make a vast difference in their standing and a House of Lords will be far more on an equality with a “House of Commons “ than a mere “Legislative Council” ever can be. If this be found impossible, though I cannot see why it should be, I would give them some other distinctive title. A leading member of the Canadian Govt told me they did not dare to propose it, as it would said their wish was to ennoble themselves, but that the words “House of Commons” were meant to be a sort of hint  to you to supply the complement of such a body.”

In the excellent decision it released yesterday, the Quebec Court of Appeal acknowledged that the creation of an unelected upper house for Canada in 1867 had indeed been connected to the politics of social class. It correctly recognized that other considerations also shaped the decision to make this body an appointed rather than elected one.

Let me quote from the Court of Appeal’s decision. Again, I will put the words relevant to the politics of social class in bold.

Canada’s founding fathers sought to implant a parliament modeled on that of the United Kingdom (see the preamble to the Constitution Act, 1867). Accordingly, there were two legislative houses, the lower one also called the House of Commons and the upper one, called the Senate, since the British colonies of North America did not have an established nobility that could constitute a legislative chamber such as the House of Lords.[1]

These two institutions enjoy the same privileges, immunities and powers as those recognized at the time by the Parliament of the United Kingdom and by its members (section 18, Constitution Act, 1867). In law their powers were identical, save with respect to bills involving the expenditure of public funds or the imposition of taxes (section 53, Constitution Act, 1867) and some constitutional amendments (section 47, Constitution Act, 1982).

The transcript of the pre-confederation conferences shows that the founding fathers discussed the role and composition of the Senate at length. There is no doubt that this institution was a fundamental component of the federal compromise in 1867.

For Sir John A. Macdonald, there was no question of senators being elected. He disliked the fact that the members of the Legislative Council of the parliament of the province of Canada had been so elected for renewable mandates of eight years.[2]

Historians recognize that for the fathers of confederation, the Senate would have the following functions:

  • · Regional representation (three then four regions);
  • · Representation of Quebec’s Anglophone minority;
  • · Sober second thought for bills and amendments to them;
  • ·Providing oversight to those who were wealthy, including the possibility of controlling any excesses of elected officials.

 

Unlike provincial legislatures, however, certain characteristics of the Senate flow from the pre-confederative compromise. It must therefore be recognized that the provinces have an interest in those characteristics. Thus, contrary to the internal constitution of a province, Parliament’s power to amend the internal federal constitution is limited by the fact that it cannot amend those aspects of its structure that affect provincial interests.

The interpretation of Canada’s constitutional history presented in the Court of Appeal’s ruling is entirely congruent with my own findings. My research on Confederation was published in some scholarly articles and a book that came out in 2008.
So how does any of this relate to the business history of Canada? Why should business historians care about this issue?
I’ve recently been reading, and enjoying, a new book about the politics of big business in Canada in the first half of the twentieth century. The book is Don Nerbas’s Dominion of Capital: The Politics of Big Business and the Crisis of the Canadian Bourgeoisie, 1914-1947.  Nerbas shows that Canadian big business was indeed in a crisis in this period. Prior to the First World War, the hegemony of private enterprise in Canadian society had not really been challenged. It is true that there were squabbles between different coalitions of business interests over issues such as the protective tariff, but both of the main political parties were, broadly-speaking, pro-business. There was no income tax, a minimal welfare state, and very limited rights to collective bargaining. In some ways, it was a businessman’s paradise.  After 1919, Canadian politics became more social democratic, thanks to the rise of left-wing parties and the adoption of collectivist policies such as the nationalization of many railways. From this point on, the electorate’s working-class majority became a threat to profits.  Nerbas shows that many Canadian businessmen came to express scepticism of democracy in this period, largely because they feared that the new political regime of one-adult, one-vote was leading the country towards socialism.
Nerbas’s book is excellent. However, I have one friendly critique of it: he doesn’t really say much about whether this growing scepticism about democracy changed business attitudes towards the Senate. Did Canadian business people come to regard the Senate and the unelected upper chamber in Quebec’s legislature, as a brake on the excesses of democracy? Did Big Business use the Senate to water down important pieces of legislation that emerged out of the House of Commons? How many business people sat in the Senate? How many company directors were in the Senate at any one time? Nerbas’s book is silent on these important questions.
These historical questions are topical given the ongoing struggle over Senate Reform.  I think that I have identified an avenue of future research for a Canadian historian.

[1]               In 1867, not only was Parliament bicameral, but so too were the legislatures of Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. Such was also the case with the colony of Prince Edward Island, as it would be when the province of Manitoba was created. The provincial upper houses were all abolished due to their redundancy and the costs they generated (David Smith, “The Senate of Canada and the Conundrum of Reform” in Jennifer Smith (Dir.) The Democratic Dilemma – Reforming the Canadian Senate, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009, p. 11, at p. 13.).

[2]               An Act Respecting the Legislative Council, Revised Statutes of Canada, 1859 (22 Vict.), c. 1, s. 1.





Special Issue of _Business History_ CFP: Towards a Narrative Turn in Business History

24 10 2013

AS: I’m posting this CFP for a theme issue of the prestigious journal Business History.

Guest Editors: Mads Mordhorst & Stefan Schwarzkopf (Copenhagen Business School) 

During the last two decades, narratives and narrative theory have gained influence at Business Schools in fields such as management studies, marketing, and organizational studies to such a degree that some scholars have framed these new perspectives as a distinctive ‘narrative turn’ (Czarniawska, 2004; Fenton and Langley, 2011; Keulen and Kroeze, 2012; Rowlinson et al., 2010). 

 

Scholars in these subfields of the business and management research community have used narrative theories and narratological concepts as analytical tools to discover who constructs narratives, in what ways, for what purpose, and how these narratives then influence sense-making and strategizing in organizations and markets. Furthermore, narratives and other linguistic entities, like metaphors and modes of storytelling, have been analyzed for their uses as performative tools by managers and other drivers of organizational change. In other words, what started as a mode of critical investigation turned into a managerial tool focused on the status quo, as scholars began to focus on how organizational change can be ‘managed’ through changes in organizational narratives.  

 

Despite the boom in research on narratives in organization theory, economics, marketing theory, and management studies, associated with scholars like David Boje, Barbara Czarniawska, Deidre McCloskey, Barbara Stern, Melanie Bryant, Andrew Brown and many others, this research has so far made only limited inroads into the business history community (Rowlinson and Clarke, 2004; Hansen, 2012). Business and management scholars who engage with these questions often ignore that ‘history’, both in the etymological and the disciplinary sense, is born with an inherent tension between ‘history’ as past and ‘history’ as narrative. This ambiguity means that the field, from Herodotus to Leopold von Ranke and Hayden White, is forever engulfed in discussions about the narrative character of the discipline and its scholarly products.

 

This, in turn, means that business historians should be in a position from where it is possible to bridge and negotiate the recent approaches in business and management studies on the one side and the practices of archival research and historiographical representation on the other. Different attempts to engage in a conversation about the fruitful tension between these two research traditions have been made recently, amongst others by Stephanie Decker, Per Hansen, Mads Mordhorst, Andrew Popp, and Mick Rowlinson. The purpose of the special issue is to intensify these discussions.

 

The guest editors encourage submissions that engage with the following problems and questions:

 

  • Narratives and narrative structures (narratology) as a method for business historians.
  • Narratives and the construction of shared memories in organizations in the past and present. 
  • Narratives constructed by professions and academic fields (accounting, marketing, strategy).
  • The potential uses of Oral History methods in business history.
  • Storytelling vs. business history: do business historians create narratives, and in what ways?
  • What metaphors do business historians rely on and construct? Are business historical models metaphors?
  • The ‘Narrative turn’ in organizational theory, management and marketing studies: how can business historians engage with and contribute to this challenge?

 

 

The timeline for the Special Issue is as follows:

 

1July, 2014                Deadline for receipt of papers

1October, 2014          Completion of review process

1December, 2014       Submission of revised papers

15January, 2014         Submission of final revisions

Spring 2015                 Planned publication

 

 

Only full papers are considered. Papers should be sent to both guest-editors, Mads Mordhorst (mmo.lpf@cbs.dk) and Stefan Schwarzkopf (ssc.lpf@cbs.dk). Please do not submit the contribution through Manuscript Central. Please see the journal website for style guidelines: http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/00076791.asp.

 

 

 

References:

 

Czarniawska, B. (2004), Narratives in Social Science Research. London: Sage.

 

Fenton, C. and Langley, A. (2011), ‘Strategy as practice and the narrative turn’, Organization Studies 32(9): 1171-1196.

 

Hansen, P. (2012), ‘Business history: a cultural and narrative approach’, Business History Review 86(4): 693-717. 

 

Keulen, S. and Kroeze, R. (2012), ‘Understanding management gurus and historical narratives: The benefits of a historic turn in management and organization studies’, Management & Organizational History 7(2): 171-189.

 

Mordhorst, Mads (2008), ‘From counterfactual history to counter-narrative history’, Management & Organizational History 3(1): 5-26.

 

Rowlinson, M. and Clark, P. (2004), ‘The treatment of history in organisation studies: towards an “historic turn”?’, Business History 46(3): 331-352. 

 

Rowlinson, M., Booth, C., Clark, P., Delahaye, A. and Procter, S. (2010) ‘Social remembering and organizational memory’, Organization Studies 31(1): 69-87.