St Antony’s College, Oxford North American Studies Seminar Series

15 10 2013

Michaelmas Term 2013

Except as noted, all events will take place from 5:00 to 6:30 PM
in the Pavilion Seminar Room, Gateway Building, St Antony’s College.

Monday, 21 October
“Gotham’s Gun Barons: New York City Arms the Americas, 1850-1934” Professor Brian DeLay, University of California Berkeley Joint session with the American History Research Seminar

Monday, 4 November
“In the Shadow of William Henry Seward:  Relations Between Canada and the Caribbean in the 1860s” Dr Andrew Smith, Coventry University

Monday, 11 November
“Ice and War: The Impacts of 20th Century Global Conflict on the Governance of Greenland” Dawn Berry, University of Oxford

Monday, 18 November
“Mass Media Strategies to Gain the Presidency in Mexico and the USA:  A Comparative Study of 2012 Electoral Campaigns” Dr Juan Carlos Barrón Pastor, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

Wednesday, 27 November
“Mexico’s Future: The Reform Agenda, Political Cooperation and National Competitiveness” Dr Duncan Wood, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Note: This event will take place in the Buttery, Hilda Besse Building, St Antony’s College from 1:00 to 2:30 PM.

Monday, 2 December 

“Canadian Counter-Terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s and Its Relevance to the 9/11 Era” Dr Steve Hewitt, University of Birmingham

Tuesday, 3 December
“Freedom in Diversity:  10 Lessons for Public Policy from Britain, Canada, France, Germany and the United States” Presentation of a project report. Joint session with the European Studies Centre Core Seminar;
co-sponsored by the Dahrendorf Programme for the Study of Freedom Note: This event will take place at the European Studies Centre, St Antony’s College.

Convenor: Dr Halbert Jones
Enquiries: north.american.studies@sant.ox.ac.uk





Thinking Like a State: The 1763 Royal Proclamation and State Control Over Inter-ethnic Economic Exchange

9 10 2013

Two Native leaders lnspect the Royal Proclamation at the National Archives of the United Kingdom, 7 October 2013.

In the last few days, people around the world have been celebrating the 250th anniversary of the Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763, a document that continues to inform the treatment of Native Americans by North American governments.  There have been scholarly conferences in Ottawa and Boston, a ceremony in Green Park in London, and protests on the streets of some Canadian cities. (For the latter, follow the #Oct7Proclaim hashtag on Twitter). ActiveHistory has been publishing a series of interesting blog posts about the anniversary.

The Royal Proclamation is important. It created what was arguably the greatest monopsony of all time.

As a business historian who is interested in economic exchange between Western and non-Western individuals, I’m interested in the Royal Proclamation as example of an attempt by the state to establish itself as a middleman and collection a fee for each transaction.  This was very much a global pattern. In some European colonies in Africa, Black Africans employed by mining companies were legally obliged to work under a sort of agency system whereby the agency, which was often the State, collected a portion of their wages. Prior to the first Opium War, the Chinese state mandated that all trade between Western and Chinese merchants at Canton be mediated by a guild called the Co-hong, which had to fork over part of its monopolist profits to the state.

The Royal Proclamation of 1763 is part of this global pattern. The colonization of North America involved a chain of transactions whereby pieces of land held by a given Native Americans community would pass into the hands of a Euro-American property owner, typically a farmer. Settlers paid a fee for the land they received from the government. In return, they got clear title to their properties. Native communities gave up their land but were compensated with a mixture of cash, goods,and services. The Royal Proclamation is important because it lengthened this chain of transactions by requiring that the land pass through the hands of the Crown (i.e., the state). Call it the mandatory middleman law. Prior to 1763, there are cases of Native American tribes  selling or leasing plots of land directly to individual white settlers without any involvement by the state. Rather than simply regulate this process by recognizing Native property rights in land and establishing a system for dealing with contractual disputes, the Crown used the 1763 Royal Proclamation to give itself monopsony powers.

The Royal Proclamation sought to change the relationship between white Anglo-American settlers and Native Americans living west of the Appalachian Mountains.  For those who believe that the Native American nations of this era had an absolute property right to the lands they controlled, the Royal Proclamation was a double-edged sword. It explicitly recognized that the Natives owned the land that aboriginal title had to be extinguished before white settlement could begin. However, the Royal Proclamation gave the Crown a monopsony right to purchase land from Native Americans.  The document forced white settlers to use the Crown as a middleman in all land purchases from Natives. It outlawed private purchase of Native American land, which in the past had sometimes led to injustice (i.e., representatives of a given First Nation with dubious diplomatic credentials selling land to white speculators for low prices). The Proclamation said that future land purchases were to be made by Crown officials “at some public Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians”.

The crucial thing is that the proclamation gave the Crown a monopsony on all future land purchases from the Native Americans. The flipside of this arrangement was that the Native Americans were left with just one buyer, which put them into a very difficult situation.

The post-1763 land sale system was a monopsony similar to the 20th century law that required Canadian farmers to sell their wheat to just one buyer, the Canadian Wheat Board.  The example of the Canadian Wheat Board, which was recently had its monopsony powers taken away (see image below), shows that white people have imposed plenty of monopsonies on each other. However, the history of trade between whites and colonized populations involves an usually large number of monopsonies.

The creation of this monopsony was justified with paternalistic rhetoric and the idea that the Natives needed to be protected from whites in selling this land. The claim that Natives were incompetent to protect their interests in a land sales system based on the free market and competing buyers was, of course, incompatible with what we know about Native economic behaviour in the fur trade. Detailed research in the archive of the Hudson’s Bay Company shows that the Natives were astute at bargaining for higher prices, particularly when there were competing groups of white fur traders bidding up the price of their commodities.

Readers will not be surprised to learn that the Royal Proclamation was enthusiastically supported by Sir William Johnson, a government official who was simultaneously pushing plan whereby the sale of furs  from Natives to whites would be closely regulated by the Crown and concentrated in just a few hands. (Johnson had a fur trading operation of his own).

Johnson’s 1764 plan to give a group of Crown-appointed merchants a monopsony on the purchase of furs from Natives soon proved to be unworkable. The 1763 Royal Proclamation, however, acquired a life of its own.

The Royal Proclamation is explicitly recognized as part of the Canadian constitution. Moreover, many of the principles contained in the proclamation informed post-Independence federal policy towards Native Americans in the United States, even though the Royal Proclamation was one of the post-1763 British policies that was resented by people in the Thirteen Colonies. The U.S. government also faced difficulties in preventing frontier violence and eventually adopted policies similar to those of the Royal Proclamation. The first in a series of Indian Intercourse Acts was passed in 1790, prohibiting unregulated trade with Native Americans in both furs and land. In 1823, the Justice Marshall ruled in the case of Johnson v. M’Intosh that only the U.S. government, and not private individuals, could purchase land from Native Americans. As Blake Watson has shown in a recent article, the Marshall’s belief in a land monopsony influenced subsequent Aboriginal policy in Canada, Australia, and elsewhere.

Land Cession Treaties in Nebraska

Canada Land Cession Treaties

The basic lesson of this story is that while monopolies are never good for the buyer, monopsonies rarely benefit the seller. The monopsony established in 1763 denied Native Americans an opportunity to consider competing offers and bargain for higher prices to relinquish their occupancy rights.

HBC Fur Trade Partners





The Business Historian and the Archive in the Post-Snowden Era

9 10 2013

Back in May, Stefan Schwarzkopf  of Copenhagen Business School posted an essay about the relationship between business historians and corporate archives on NEP-HIST.  You can download the entire paper here.

Abstract:  Archival records are a constitutive element of business historical research, and such research, in turn, is fundamental for a holistic understanding of the role of enterprise in modern capitalist societies. Despite an increasing debate within business history circles about the need to theorize the historian as author and creator of narratives, a fuller reflection on the uses and limitations of the archive in business historical research has not yet taken place. This article takes its lead from theories of organisational epistemology, and asks to what extent business historians are trapped by an outdated, realist methodology and epistemology which is in danger of ignoring the multiple roles that archives play in their knowledge production.

Essentially, Schwarzkopf  is asking for business historians to be more critical in their use of this particular set of primary sources. Scholars working in other branches of history have recently become much more conscious of the ways in which the selectiveness of their archives bias their work. For instance, historians of criminal law are aware that police archives give us the perspective of State employees, not those of the people who were deemed to be criminals in a given era. Religious historians are acutely aware that church archives give us the perspectives of the missionaries, not the so-called “pagans” they were attempting to convert. The adoption of critical stances to archives by other groups of historians  has been driven by the emergence of postmodernist and postcolonial perspectives on the sociology of knowledge.  Most business historians, according to Schwarzkopf, are stuck in an outdated and uncritical mindset towards the corporate archives that are the foundation of their research. They are, in his view, naive empiricists.

Stephanie Decker, a business historian at Aston Business School, has followed up Schwarzkopf’s piece with a short reaction essay of her own, Decker’s piece draws on her research into the area of African business history and the development policies, which has involved trips to the World Bank Archive in Washington, DC.

In my view, the most interesting part of the essays by Decker and Schwarzkopf relate to digital technology.  Since the 1960s, government and corporate archivists have been struggling with the issue of how to save data recorded on punch cards, magnetic tapes, and successive generations of electronic storage material.  (You can read about the first generation of digital archivists in the US government here). More recently, there have been efforts to put documents online.  For instance, you can now read the handwritten letters of Abraham Lincoln from the comfort of your own home.

Decker applauds organizations such as the World Bank for digitizing parts of their vast holdings and putting scanned images of certain document categories online.  She points out that since digitization of hard copies is inevitably selective, it may bias future historical research towards topics and perspectives supported by those documents which happened to put online.  Decker writes:

How does digitisation affect how archives are used, and vice versa? Will it determine what the collection stands for, more so than the entire body of files? Perhaps not a new problem for libraries that contain individual high value items that eclipse the totality of their collection, but certainly a phenomenon that will spread with digitisation. Just consider decisions to digitise parts of archival collections that are of greater public interest, such as World Bank’s digitisation of the Robert McNamara’s files. Faced with the impossibility of digitising an archive as vast as theirs, files of greater relevance to present-day audiences are prioritised, negating the need for people to physically enter 1818 H Street, NW, and engage with the overall collection. Is this a manipulation by the archivists, or is this it the pressure of demand shaping organisational responses?

Schwarzkopf  asserts that digital records are easier to manipulate and delete than the hard copies. (For the time being, let’s assume this claim is correct, although I’m sceptical because many electronic documents leave traces that can be recovered by experts.)  Selective editing of archived emails may create problems for future business historians interested in the early internet era (i.e., the present). Observing that much business communications (reports, emails, memos, etc.) are increasingly becoming  digital-only, he suggests that there is little to stop governments and corporations employing twenty-first  century Winston Smiths to deal with their own digital records in the same way?

Schwarzkopf is here alluding to the protagonist of George Orwell’s 1984.  I’m not suggesting that Schwarzkopf’s concerns about the deletion of incriminating documents are invalid.  There have been examples of such documents “disappearing” from archives or the archives simply remaining personally closed to researchers. Enron employees shredded many documents in the last few days of that company’s existence. Deutsche Bank kept records related to the Holocaust secret for years. In 2005,  Hydro One, a Canadian SOE, suddenly closed its archive to all researchers when a non-academic began to use their archive to find material to support a lawsuit against the company. Art has imitated life:  the plot of the film Michael Clayton revolves around the efforts of a fictitious company to hide a document

Personally, however, I am less worried than Schwarzkopf  about the selective editing by people looking to hide incriminating documents than about the simple accidental deletion of documents. The most serious problem is the deliberate deletion of documents related to storage costs.

Today’s business historians depend on documents that others have kindly saved for us.  Since 1934, the Business Archives Council in the UK has been helping companies to save their archives and make them available to outside researchers.  There are equivalent organizations in other countries. These efforts, which were supported by the business historians of earlier decades, make our research possible today. We have an obligation to help preserve today’s corporate records for the future.

This means that we need to think about how we can save the data formats that are being created today. It occurs to me that cloud computing might allow us to do this cheaply.  Many companies now outsource the storage of their email and other data to trusted firms such as Amazon Web Services. Interestingly enough, the cloud computing divisions of Amazon and IBM are now suing each other for the right to store the data created by the CIA and the NSA in the United States.

It occurs to me that the Business Archives Council or some other charitable organization might undertake to save all or part of the data that a cross-section of companies upload to the cloud.  Perhaps it could be a completely separate organization. Let’s call it the Business E-Archives Council or BEAC for short. Under this scenario, the customers of the cloud computing firm would consent to the release of part of their data to BEAC on the understanding that the data would be kept in a secure environment and would only be released to the researchers for a predetermined period.

It seems to me that there are three basic reasons  a company might be reluctant to consent to a heritage organization copying a cross-section of their electronic files for posterity.

1) The first is concern that the data might fall into the hands of enemies of the firm.

2) The second  is the sheer administrative hassle of asking IT people in their company to liaise with with the archivists at the heritage organization to decide which email accounts to copy and how to go about transferring the files over.  Sharing information with others costs real resources, most notably time. That’s true regardless of whether one is setting up data backup account for one’s home computer or arranging cloud computing services for a major bank. It is difficult enough to synchronize data systems within a given organisation (such as a university at the start of term) let alone ask IT staff to allow outsiders to get involved.

3) The third concern relates to Public Relations in the post Edward Snowden era. A company might be reluctant to do business with a company that had announced it was allowing the BEAC to record some documents. After all, they might worry that consumers would be concerned about the protection of their data.

The first and third concerns could be addressed through a variety of legal and social mechanisms. First, you could reinforce the confidentiality agreements between the companies and the BEAC by incorporating the BEAC through a special piece of legislation that removes any doubt about whether the BEAC’s right to protect the data for term prescribed in the contract. In other words, the BEAC’s charter would be a special act of parliament or Congress.  Including representatives of the country’s top companies and business leaders on the board of the BEAC would also bolster the credibility of the firm with the data-generating companies. Including prominent citizens of the country in question on the board of the committee might help to allay consumer fears about the BEAC.

Cloud computing would help to reduce to the costs of participating for the companies. Since company X has already done the difficult work of making its systems work with those of the cloud computing company, allowing the BEAC to record a cross-section of their archived emails would not cost them any person hours. I admit that the connection between the cloud computing companies and BEAC would cost some money to set up, but surely it is easier for the BEAC to deal with just one or two cloud computing firms than with all of the companies served by these firms.

The benefits of recording the electronic data for future generations of business historians would be massive. Exciting things happen when academics meet big data. Consider what Google N-gram allows literary scholars and people in the field of corpus linguistics to do. I would love to do keyword frequency counts of the internal correspondence of the companies I study.

 





LSE Business History Unit Seminars for Michaelmas Term 2013

7 10 2013

 

 

14 October

Andrew Smith (University of Coventry)

‘Creating the Post-Colonial Bank:

HSBC in the 1960s’ 

28 October

Simon Mollan and Kevin Tennent

(The York Management School)

   ‘Towards a New Organizational Theory of British International Business: The Selection Trust as a distributed firm, c.1930-1979′ 

11 November*

Andy Friend (ex-Laing)

‘UK PFI/PPP in the Noughties: Why we threw the baby out with the bathwater’*

 

 

 

The seminars will be held in Room 1.04, Tower Two.

*This is a BHU-ING Seminar which will be held at ING Bank, 60 London Wall. Pre-registration is required: please contact t.r.gourvish@lse.ac.uk if you wish to attend.





Museum of American Finance: The Fed at 100

5 10 2013

The Museum of American Finance recently opened “The Fed at 100,” an exhibition commemorating the  centennial anniversary of the Federal Reserve System, featuring the Federal Reserve  Bank of New York. The exhibition will illuminate the complex workings of the US central bank, which was established 1914.

The exhibition will include a unique visitor experience  designed to provide a firsthand view of the Fed’s inner workings and position within the  federal government. Visitors will be invited to enter and explore the offices of four  people who play critical roles in designing policy and overseeing the central bank: the Chairman of the Board of Governors; a Reserve Bank president; a research assistant;  and the Chairman of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee.
The exhibition will include an audio tour of 100 objects representing different facets of  the Fed. 
Renowned economic historians Dr. Richard Sylla and Dr. Eugene White have served as  content advisors for this exhibition.

Major support has been provided by The Adirondack Trust Company, the Chinese Museum of Finance, the Friedman Family  Foundation, Macy’s, the National Endowment for the Humanities and Tishman Speyer  Properties, LP. “The Fed at 100” will be on view through October 1, 2014.

The Museum of American Finance, an affiliate of the Smithsonian Institution, is the  nation’s only public museum dedicated to preserving, exhibiting and teaching about  American finance and financial history. It is located at 48 Wall Street.





John Turner on the Post-2008 Crisis in the Discipline of Economics

4 10 2013

Professor John Turner, who is a financial historian at Queen’s University Belfast, has posted some interesting thoughts about the post-2008 crisis in economics. The 2008 GFC hasn’t exactly discredited mainstream economics, but it has caused people to ask some tough questions about the limitations of this intellectual tradition.

Five years after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, economists are still picking over the corpse of the financial system in an attempt to understand why the financial crisis happened. Some simply blame capitalism. Such a view is naive at best. For others,and I include myself in this camp, there probably wasn’t enough capitalism. In this op-edRoman Frydman and Michael Goldberg, extremely insightful economists, point the finger of blame elsewhere – the discipline of economics. Economists had totally the wrong economic models in their toolkit – they had models which assumed that the economy works in a mechanistic way, much like a complex piece of machinery. This reduces economics to an engineering problem. But at its heart, economics is a social and political science. The real issue for me is not whether economists had the wrong models (they quite obviously did), but why did they have the wrong models.

Read more here.

The film Inside Job is about the complicity of the economics profession in the policies that led to the GFC. The film talks about possible conflicts of interest and advances a sort of theory of disciplinary capture which is analogous to the regulatory capture often associated with the financial sector.  In regulatory capture, the industry being regulated exerts undue influence over the regulatory body, perhaps through revolving door recruitment. In disciplinary capture, key members of an academic discipline are persuaded to advance  a set of arguments that is congruent with the industry’s PR and lobbying campaigns.

Personally, I don’t think that disciplinary capture explains the more fundamental problems in mainstream economics, which go well beyond the few economists with close ties to Wall Street. I think that the problems in the discipline of economics are much deeper and are rooted in the rational actor to which mainstream economists subscribe. As many people have shown, this model does a poor job of accounting for the behaviour of investors in particular historical contexts. Investors and other participants in capital markets are actually more altruistic than the rational actor model suggests. That was certainly the conclusion I reached in an article that was published earlier this year. That article examines the extent to which  political views of turn of the last century British investors influenced the global allocation of British capital. Much of the existing literature on pre-1914 British investment overseas dismisses the possibility that the pattern in Britain’s capital exports was significantly affected by imperial patriotism. This article suggests that imperial sentiment did indeed influence the destination of British capital exports; at least some British investors were willing to accept a lower anticipated rate of return because they valued the psychological satisfaction of investing in territories that happened to be part of the British Empire.





CFP: The Association of Business Historians 22nd Annual Conference, 27-28 June 2014

2 10 2013

Call for Papers
The Association of Business Historians 22nd Annual Conference, 27-28 June 2014
Newcastle University Business School

Crisis, Accountability and Institutions.

The Association of Business Historians 22nd Annual Conference will be held at Newcastle University

Business School on 27-28 June 2014. Our keynote speaker is Professor Roy Suddaby who is the Eldon Foote Chair of Law and Society at the University of Alberta. He is the Editor of the Academy of Management Review. His research interests are in understanding processes of profound change. His current research focuses on the role of corporate historians and corporate art collections.

To reflect calls for more oversight and accountability of both public and private sector organisations, the theme of the conference is ‘Crisis, Accountability and Institutions’. The dominance of the neoliberal discourse from the early 1980s culminated in the hegemony of finance with higher rates of return to capital, a widening of income inequality, a reduction in the role of the state (in education, welfare and regulation), privatization of state assets; unsustainable household debt, restrictions on the bargaining power of labour, and declining manufacturing investment. This hegemony raises questions of how neoliberalism emerged across the globe, how it was shaped, and how the institutions that supported it were constructed and gained legitimacy. Historians could draw parallels with other periods such as the late nineteenth century. After the depression of the 1890s, profitability similarly
increased stimulated by science based innovations and the managerial revolution. This was followed by the Great Depression of the 1930s.

 

 
The conference committee welcomes proposals for individual papers or complete research tracks of 90 minutes in length. Each individual paper proposal should include a short abstract, a list of 3 to 5 key words, and a brief CV of the presenter. Proposals for research tracks should include a cover letter containing a session title and the rationale for the research track. The conference organisers also welcome research papers on any topic related to business history which are outside of the conference
theme. If you have any questions, please contact Tom McGovern at: abh.conf@newcastle.ac.uk.
The deadline for submissions is 21 February 2014. Notification of acceptance will be made by 15 April 2014. Please send proposals by email to: abh.conf@newcastle.ac.uk





Thoughts on the History of Public Finances on U.S. Government Shutdown, Day 1

1 10 2013

Today is the first day of the US government shutdown, which was triggered by a political impasse in Washington. It is a good time to reflect on what economic historians have said about public finance. 

Right now, the media are obsessed with the likely short-term impact of the shutdown on financial markets. Others have discussed what I regard as more fundamental question: what would be the impact of the US government defaults on its scheduled debt payments because of the political gridlock.   Evidence that the US government was incapable or rather unwilling to pay interest on its debts promptly would likely raise its borrowing costs. The 1979 US government default on part of its debt, which was caused by a mere computer problem made it harder for the US government to borrow. 

The conventional wisdom is that an increase in US government borrowing costs would be bad news for private borrowers. Economic history suggests that there could be a silver lining if investors perceive government bonds as relatively risky, as government borrowing crowds out private borrowing.  In this context, it is worthwhile considering the argument of Peter Temin and Hans-Joachim Voth,  Prometheus Shackled: Goldsmith Banks and England’s financial revolution after 1700. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.  These authors challenge the traditional view that the reduction in public sector borrowing costs that followed the Glorious Revolution in 1688 contributed to the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century. They suggest the 1688 political settlement, which led investors to feel more confident that the government would repay money, resulted in the diversion of capital from industrial enterprises and into the state, which then spent the money on activities with a low social rate of return. In other words, low borrowing costs allowed the British government to go on a military and naval spending spree that starved the private sector of funds. The Industrial Revolution began in Britain despite rather than because of the post-1688 Financial Revolution.

After 1688, Britain underwent a revolution in public finance, and the cost of borrowing declined sharply. Leading scholars have argued that easier credit for the government, made possible by better property-rights protection, lead to a rapid expansion of private credit. The Industrial Revolution, according to this view, is the result of the preceding revolution in public finance.

 

In Prometheus Shackled, prominent economic historians Peter Temin and Hans-Joachim Voth examine this hypothesis using new, detailed archival data from 18th century banks. They conclude the opposite: the financial revolution led to an explosion of public debt, but it stifled private credit. This led to markedly slower growth in the English economy. Temin and Voth collected detailed data from several goldsmith banks: Child’s, Gosling’s, Freame and Gould, Hoare’s, and Duncombe and Kent. The excellent records from Hoare’s, founded by Sir Richard Hoare in 1672, offer particular insight.

 

Numerous entrants into the banking business tried their hand at deposit-taking and lending in the early 17th century; few survived and fewer thrived. Hoare’s and a small group of competitors did both. Temin and Voth chart the growth of the successful banks in the face of frequent wars and heavy-handed regulations. Their new data allows insights into the interaction between financial and economic development. Government regulations such as (a sharply lower) maximum interest rate caused severe misallocation of credit, and a misguided attempt to lighten the nation’s debt burden led directly to the South Sea Bubble in 1720. Frequent wars caused banks to call in loans, resulting in a sharply slower economic growth rate. Based on detailed micro-data, the authors present conclusive evidence that wartime borrowing crowded out investment. Far from fostering economic development, England’s financial revolution after 1688 did much to stifle it — the Hanoverian “warfare state” was a key reason for slow growth during Britain’s Industrial Revolution. Prometheus Shackled is a revealing new take on one of the most important periods of economic and financial development.

 

The argument of Temin and Voth complements an argument I made in a book published in 2008. That book showed that Canadian Confederation, i.e., the political union of the British North American colonies in the 1860s was designed to improve their collective creditworthiness (i.e., to facilitate public-sector borrowing). I also showed that Confederation in 1867 was followed by a massive borrowing and spending spree and a rising Debt-to-GDP ratio. In the book’s conclusion, I speculated that this massive spending spree, which was devoted to public works projects of dubious economic value, may have reduced overall economic growth by crowding out private investment. The Canadian economy grew very slowly between 1873 and the mid-1890s. Indeed, Canada became a massive net exporter of people, as many young Canadians flocked to the United States, where the private sector was booming and the government was focused on paying off the massive debt incurred during the Civil War.  Of course, certain private interests in Canada benefited from government largesse. They did very well, even though the country haemorrhaged people. 

Anyway, the research by Temin and Voth suggests that if a US government default on its debt permanently increases its borrowing costs, capital will be diverted from US government uses to private borrowers. Whether this would be good for long-run economic growth is difficult to say. The US government spends its borrowed money on some very good things, such as medical research, but it also squanders money on unnecessary wars and the like. Surely this money would be better used in Silicon Valley or in building new shopping centres. 





Third Canadian Business History Workshop

27 09 2013

The third Canadian Business History Workshop will feature presentation and discussion of two draft papers (circulated in advance). The workshops have become a regular meeting of the network of Canadian scholars working on varied aspects of business history, and we welcome all new participants.

This fall’s workshop will be held at the University of Guelph, 50 Stone Road, Guelph, ON, Canada, N1G 2W1 on Friday, 15 November 2013. 

We will start from noon onwards with lunch, which is kindly offered by the Department of History. Please make your way to the MacKinnon Building, Room 132 for both lunch and sessions.

 

The schedule is:

12:00-1:30 pm   LUNCH

1.30-2.30 pm     Jason Russell (Empire State College) “Making Canada’s Organization Men: Clarence Fraser, Bell Canada, and the Shaping of Modern Management”

2.30-3.00 pm     COFFEE BREAK

3.00-4.00 pm     Kristin Hall (University of Waterloo) “Business Men and Unmanly Practices: Trade Journals and The Gendered Challenges of Growth and Competition in the Late Nineteenth Century Canada.”

 

To facilitate planning, please confirm your attendance by sending an email to Andrew Ross (jaross@uoguelph.ca) by November 1st, 2013. Early notice would be appreciated.

 

If you cannot attend, but are interested in future events and news about Canadian business history, please join the Canadian Business History Group / Groupe d’historiens des affaires canadiens, accessible here





MintChip and Ideology

24 09 2013

The Royal Canadian Mint is launching a new electronic payment system called MintChip.

The impression I get is that this is a near field system for small payments (e.g., grabbing a quick coffee from Starbucks). It is fascinating that the consortium of banks that runs Interac isn’t complaining about a government agency introducing a computing payment system. Private companies normally hate it when they have to compete with a government agency that doesn’t have to make a profit, especially one that enjoys the benefits of seniorage (i.e., the right to whip up additional money when needed).

In 2011, a report produced by the Task Force for Payments System Review, a government-mandated review body, highlighted the need for payment reform in Canada. Some 27 EU countries and the BRIC region were significantly outpacing Canada’s transition to digital payments, the review body said. “Even Peru and Romania” were ahead of the country, it said.

That seems to be true, at least in my experience. The UK is far more of a cashless society than Canada.  Canada used to be leader in this field but it is falling behind. (One of the other things I dislike about Canada is that they charge you a fee for withdrawing money from ATMs owned by other Canadian banks).

Needless to say, Jon Matonis, a columnist at Forbes magazine in the United States, hates the idea of a government getting into the business of payment systems. He seems to regard  MintChip as almost as bad as Canada’s system of evil socialized medicine. Conflating the goals of Bitcoin with those of all electronic payment systems, Matonis writes that: “The point of digital currency, and especially free-market digital currency, is to broaden the avenues for issuance and adoption of alternative nonpolitical monetary units.”

The fact the Harper government is allowing the Royal Canadian Mint to compete with private companies in this way is a reminder that Canada’s Conservatives are left-wing by US standards.

P.S. You can read about the history of the Royal Canadian Mint here. It was established  in Ottawa in 1908, as a branch of Britain’s Royal Mint. It officially  became the Royal Canadian Mint in 1931, once its assets were transferred by the British to the Government  of Canada.  The Mint became a Crown Corporation in 1969