
The Dictionary of Canadian Biography’s website has recently been showcasing a number of biographies of business leaders. Today, they are profiling Sir William Price, a pulp and paper mogul.

The Dictionary of Canadian Biography’s website has recently been showcasing a number of biographies of business leaders. Today, they are profiling Sir William Price, a pulp and paper mogul.

In the summer of 2014, people throughout the world will commemorate the centenary of the start of the First World War. For historians of international business and management, this period will be an opportunity to reflect on the impact of the war on the industries and companies they study. On Thursday 10 July and Friday 11 July 2014, a workshop on the war’s impact on international business will take place in the City of London. The First World War had a dramatic and immediate impact on international business, particularly the financial services sector, but the impact quickly spread to other sectors as international trade and investment were disrupted. As the war progressed, the integrated world economy that had emerged during the first great era of globalization disintegrated and liberal assumptions and practices were discarded. The realities of the total war shattered the assumption that it would be “business as usual.” The disruption of international supply chains by the war created threats and opportunities for firms in many countries. The seizure of patents, factories, and other assets in belligerent countries created complex legal issues that lasted for decades. The war challenged the ascendancy of British international business and capital, opening the way for rivals from newly industrialising countries to compete in markets around the world.
Pre-1914 Advert for Singer Sewing Machines, Russia.
The impact of the war on international business lasted long after the fighting stopped, due in part to the nature of the peace settlement dictated by the victorious allies, the growth of institutions of global governance, and changes to the international political economy. In particular, the transfer of financial power from the City of London to Wall Street was not matched by a corresponding increase in the willingness of the United States to guarantee the political underpinnings of an integrated global economy. In turn, this change spurred organizational innovation and change among international firms as they adapted their strategies and structures to a changed business environment.
We are seeking contributors who are interested in presenting their research at the workshop and publishing their papers as part of an edited collection. Contributors can be of any nationality and can be from any discipline, although our expectation is that all papers will focus on the impact of the war on international business, should be based on original research, and should expressly engage with and seek to develop historiography and/or reflect on relevant business and management theory. We would welcome research on the history of international firms based in Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Japan, China, Canada, Australia, Russia, the United States, as well as those operating in Latin America, Africa, and Asia and all countries affected by the war either directly or indirectly.
Themes that might be addressed include:
We are currently pursuing external funding for this workshop and it our hope that there will be no charge for attendance. However, there may be a nominal charge to cover costs such as refreshments. Attendees will have to arrange their own accommodation.
Please send a 300-word abstract of your paper plus a short CV to Andrew Smith, ab0352@coventry.ac.uk by 1 December 2013.
If you wish to discuss a possible paper proposal informally before the deadline, please contact us.
Conference Organizing Committee: Andrew Smith (Coventry University), Simon Mollan and Kevin Tennent (York Management School).
Conference Scientific Committee: Neil Forbes (Coventry University); Rory Miller (University of Liverpool); John Singleton (Sheffield Hallam University); Grietjie Verhoef( University of Johannesburg).
Conference Venue: East India House, 109-117 Middlesex St, London, E1 7JF
AS: University of British Columbia Press is about to publish a new book on the history of the bauxite industry.

As the key component in aluminium production, bauxite became one of the most important minerals of the last one hundred years. But around the world its effects on people and economies varied broadly — for some it meant jobs, progress, or a political advantage over rival nations, but for many others, it meant exploitation, pollution, or the destruction of a way of life.
Aluminium Ore explores the often overlooked history of bauxite in the twentieth century, and in doing so examines the social, political, and economic forces that shaped the time. Its development became a strategic industry during the First World War, and then the subject of international struggle for dominance during the Second World War. Yet in post-war years it was globalization, not military conquest, that expanded global value chains. The extraction of bauxite — a mineral found mostly in the developing world — was made profitable by the growth of multinational corporations and the spread of globalization, leaving behind a troubled cultural and environmental legacy.
In this wide-ranging collection, scholars from around the world consider multiple perspectives on this history — from Guinea to Nazi Germany to Jamaica — all while examining the central place of one commodity in a time of change.
About the editors:
Robin S. Gendron is an associate professor in the Department of History at Nipissing University.
Mats Ingulstad is a postdoctoral fellow in the Department of History and Classical Studies at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
Espen Storli is an associate professor in the Department of History and Classical Studies at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology
Table of Contents:
Introduction: Opening Pandora’s Bauxite: A Raw Materials Perspective on Globalization Processes in the Twentieth Century / Mats Ingulstad, Espen Storli, and Robin S. Gendron
1 The Global Race for Bauxite, 1900-40 / Espen Storli
2 “Of the Highest Imperial Importance”: British Strategic Priorities and the Politics of Colonial Bauxite, ca. 1916–ca. 1958 / Andrew Perchard
3 Nazi Germany’s Pursuit of Bauxite and Alumina / Hans Otto Frøland
4 National Security Business? The United States and the Creation of the Jamaican Bauxite Industry / Mats Ingulstad
5 The Soviet Union’s “Bauxite Problem” / Stephen Fortescue
6 “Greece Has Been Endowed by Nature with This Precious Material”: The Economic History of Bauxite in the European Periphery, 1920s-70s / Leda Papastefanaki
7 The Volta River Project and Decolonization, 1945-57: The Rise and Fall of an Integrated Aluminum Project / Jon Olav Hove
8 Canada and the Nationalization of Alcan’s Bauxite Operations in Guinea and Guyana / Robin S. Gendron
9 Transnational Restructuring and the Jamaican Bauxite Industry: The Swinging Pendulum of Bargaining Power / Lou Anne Barclay and Norman Girvan
10 Issues of Governance, Liberalization, Policy Space, and the Challenges of Development: Reflections from the Guinean Bauxite-Aluminum Sector / Bonnie Campbell
11 White Metal: Bauxite, Labour, and the Land under Alcan in Twentieth-Century Guyana, Jamaica, and Australia / Bradley Cross
12 Battles over Bauxite in East India: The Khondalite Mountains of Khondistan / Samarendra Das and Felix Padel
13 Success without Bauxite: Norsk Hydro’s Long Wait to Achieve Backward Integration / Pål Thonstad Sandvik
AS: This paper was presented at the EBHA. You can read the full paper here. I’m going to publish a lengthy blog post with some thoughts on this paper in the next few days.
Christopher Kobrak, ESCP Europe/Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto
cpkobrak@aol.com (Contact author)
Joe Martin, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto
Donald S. Brean, Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto
Abstract:
Recent tensions in the Eurozone have elicited relatively little public discussions of how large federal systems grappled over time with forging a common financial and monetary system. This paper draws on the disparate experiences of two North American countries from similar traditions – Canada and the United States, with a view to putting that process in historical context. Despite advantages which Europe does not enjoy, these countries’ efforts to build their national banking systems and common currency as well as unify their national debt followed a long and varied path. The paper argues that Europeans would profit from the lesson that the process required many difficult political steps in order to build the necessary consensus for these systems to function, with all their flaws, as a binding rather than divisive force. We contend that those who supported and implemented the introduction of the Euro ignored much of the institutional and organizational infrastructure required to successfully run an “optimal currency area.”
AS: There was a panel at the European Business History Association conference that should interest scholars of Canadian economic development.
Chair: Kevin Tennent (kevin.tennent@york.ac.uk)
Discussant: Ralf Banken (ralf.banken@t-online.de)
Zdravka Brunkova & Martin Shanahan, Univ. of South Australia, Australia, Did democratic institutions help Australia avoid the resource curse?
Andreas Dugstad, Espen Storli and Pål Thonstad Sandvik, NTNU, Regulation of Natural Resources in the Nordic Countries 1890-1940
Andrew Perchard, Strathclyde University, UK, Energy as National Aspiration: The Politics of Power in Scotland, 1945- 2014
AS:
In 2002, George W. Bush was reported to have told Tony Blair that the French “have no word for ‘entrepreneur.’ ” He appears to have made this statement, which he later denied, in the course of arguing that French culture is somehow less supportive of entrepreneurship than the cultures of the English-speaking nations.[1]
The comment attributed to Bush was appalling on three levels. First, “entrepreneur” is a French word. Second, there is lots of entrepreneurship in France and other French-speaking societies. Third, French thinkers have played a crucial role in developing the modern concept of the entrepreneur.
I’m posting a review of a new biography of Jean-Baptiste Say (1767-1832), the French economists. Actually, this book is the first ever biography of Say in any language, which is itself surprising. The other interesting thing about this biography is that it looks at Say’s business career and relates it to his economic ideas. Say was himself an entrepreneur. Moreover, he wrote about entrepreneurs.
It is a commonplace in the history of economic thought to say that pre-Schumpeter economists said little about entrepreneurs and instead preferred to deal with highly abstract concepts, such as comparative advantage. There are, however, some important exceptions to this generalization, most of whom came from the French-speaking world. It appears that writers on economic topics in the French speaking world were much more aware of the importance of the individual entrepreneur.
One of these writers was, of course, Richard Cantillon (1680s-1734), the Irish-born Parisian banker. Cantillon’s interest in entrepreneurship reflected his own background in business, which included a stint promoting the Compagnie de l’Occident, a North American colonial venture commonly known as the Mississippi Company.[2] In his 1730 Essai sur la Nature du Commerce en Général, Cantillon defined an entrepreneur as an investor who ventured capital in a relatively risky enterprise in the hopes of earning high profits.
Cantillon paved the way for the discussion of entrepreneurship by Jean-Baptiste Say who discussed the crucial role of the entrepreneur in creating value by shifting resources into faster-growing parts of the economy.[3] The word entrepreneur entered the English language very slowly: when the Say’s works were translated into English in 1836, the translator decided to render “entrepreneur” as “adventurer”, a term reminiscent of the investors who had “adventured” or lent money to the Hudson’s Bay Company. As the translator noted in a footnote, “the term entrepreneur is difficult to render in English ; the corresponding word, undertaker, being already appropriated to a limited sense. It signifies the master-manufacturer in manufacture, the farmer in agriculture, and the merchant in commerce ; and generally in all three branches, the person who takes upon himself the immediate responsibility, risk, and conduct of a concern of industry, whether upon his own or a borrowed capital. For want of a better word, it will be rendered into English by the term adventurer” [4][5]
The history of economic thought is one of my side-bar academic interests, so I will certainly have to read this new biography of Say.
[1] Geoffrey Nunberg, “The Entrepreneurial Spirit” National Public Radio “Fresh Air” Commentary, 28 October 2004.
[2] Antoin E Murphy, Richard Cantillon, Entrepreneur and Economist (Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Clarendon Press, 1986).
[3] Evelyn L Forget, The Social Economics of Jean-Baptiste Say: Markets and Virtue (London: Routledge, 1999).
[4] Jean Say, Traité d’économie politique. A treatise on political economy or The production, distribution, and consumption of wealth. By Jean-Baptiste Say. Translated from the fourth edition of the French, (Philadelphia, Grigg & Elliot, 1836), 78.
[5] N. S. B. Gras, “Capitalism-Concepts and History,” Bulletin of the Business Historical Society 16, no. 2 (April 1, 1942): 24.
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Evert Schoorl, Jean-Baptiste Say: Revolutionary, Entrepreneur, Economist. London: Routledge. 2013. xix + 210 pp. £85 (hardcover), ISBN: 978-415-66517-9.
Reviewed for EH.Net by Steven Kates, School of Economics, Finance and Marketing, RMIT University (Melbourne, Australia).
A Truly Upright, Brave and Enlightened Man
This is the kind of book that ought to make the history of economic thought an essential part in the education of any economist. It adds depth to what you think you know already, adds in much you may not have known before, and makes you think about economic theory in a different way, deepening your understanding of how economies work.
Evert Schoorl’s Jean-Baptiste Say: Revolutionary, Entrepreneur, Economist is surprisingly the first biography of Say ever written. It thus discusses the life of one of the most influential economists who has ever lived and whose work still has much to offer to both economists and historians of thought. Even when you thought you knew who he was, the context of his writings and what he stood for, unless you really had done the work, large slices of what really matters are unlikely ever to have become known to you.
Start with this. If you know anything about Say then you know he was an entrepreneur. The conclusion I had always drawn from this was that he was in the mold of David Ricardo, someone whose work in the business world carved out a life of prosperity in which he could indulge his economic pursuits. Instead, Say ran a succession of businesses in which the continual problems that every entrepreneur must expect to face were the problems he faced himself. Each of the businesses he engaged in were difficult and none succeeded into the long term.
Indeed, until well past middle age, and continuing almost until the last years of his life, he was in a continual struggle to maintain an adequate personal income, and while he was still running his businesses it was a constant struggle to keep his businesses afloat. And rather than the secure foundation a rich industrialist might have been expected to have, his was a life of great personal financial insecurity where every franc he earned counted. As Schoorl points out, “at the age of fifty, Say still did not have a regular and safe income” (p. 91). It is an incredible part of the story finding just how difficult Say’s personal finances were for most of his life.
Thus, the story of his standing up to Napoleon at the height of his powers makes Say’s own personal integrity a matter of actual astonishment. Who else are you aware of who has a personal history that includes anything like the following kind of event, let alone by someone who faced relentless financial insecurity almost to the end of his days? “When the Traité had been published in 1803, Bonaparte invited its author to his domicile at Mailmaison in September and asked him to rewrite certain free-market parts in a more interventionist vein. … Upon his refusal to comply, Say lost his membership of the Tribunat. Nevertheless he was offered a tax collectorship … far away from Paris [getting him out of Paris probably being the reason for the offer]. … But Say equally refused the tax directorship” (p. 36).
Say himself later in life described this moment. And in reading this passage, it is well to remember that according to Schoorl Say’s annual income in 1795 was around 5000 francs (p. 180). “During my period as Tribun, not wanting to deliver orations in favour of the usurper, and not having the permission to speak against him, I drafted and published my Traité d’Economie Politique. Bonaparte commanded me to attend him and offered me 40 thousand francs a year to write in favour of his opinion; I refused, and was caught up in the purge of 1804” (p. 36).
This is near superhuman. But it’s just this kind of integrity and resolve that made him stick to his guns during the many controversies he involved himself in throughout his life. And it is also the kind of detail that makes this such a compelling biography. There really was a life about which a story was there to be told and most certainly it is that story Schoorl has now indeed told and told very well.
But this is an intellectual biography as well, which inevitably includes a discussion of Say’s Law. Therefore, I am compelled to note that Schoorl has brought me into the story but should you be concerned that my positive review is in return for his own positive discussion of my own work, let me first note this: where Schoorl has written “he has given the best explanation of the law of markets” the “he” referred to is Murray Rothbard. Well I might dispute this, but not here; all is forgiven since what we find is the most judicious short discussion of two centuries of debate over the law of markets to be found anywhere, with myself found at the extreme end of the pro-Say spectrum, which I fear is actually the case.
Re “Say’s” Law I will say only this. There is firstly the principle that demand is constituted by supply, that goods buy goods. That is from Say and the physiocrats. And then there is the question whether an economy can suffer from demand deficiency. That is the issue that has remained controversial to this day but has its origins in James Mill who in explaining in 1808 why too little demand was never the cause of recessions brought forward as part of his argument a passage he had found in Say. That Say accepted this point is clearly shown in his Letters to Mr. Malthus published in 1820 during the general glut debate after Malthus’s Principleswere published that same year, but that was not Say’s own original contribution
These were not, however, the only controversies Say found himself in the midst of, with his discussion with Ricardo and others over the theory of value possibly the most important in terms of the history of economic theory. But other issues were important in their own time with the question surrounding whether slavery was a profitable basis for an economy of immediate practical interest. Whether Say thought it was or it wasn’t – on this he changed his mind later in life – he was always disgusted by the practice.
Evert Schoorl has told an exceptionally important story in an exceptionally interesting way. The person who emerges is the same person described by John Stuart Mill who had met Say in 1820: “a truly upright, brave and enlightened man” (p 109). And so he was – as this book so comprehensively shows.
Steven Kates teaches economics at RMIT University in Melbourne, Australia. His own most recent book is Defending the History of Economic Thought (Edward Elgar 2013), which is, so far as he knows, the first book ever written on this subject.steve.kates@rmit.edu.au
Profs in North American universities are currently finalizing their syllabi (i.e., the documents students are given on the first day of class that last the weekly readings, assignment due dates, etc). Given that so many people are currently working on syllabi, it’s not surprising that #overlyhonestsyllabi was trending on Twitter last night. Some very smart academics were thinking up of funny things they would never dare to put in an actual syllabus.
Here are my favourites:
“@dandrezner: If you ask a question that’s plainly answered in the syllabus, I’ll remember you and not in a good way. #overlyhonestsyllabi”
“@kesearles: You don’t know how many grandmothers my class has killed #overlyhonestsyllabi”
“@dandrezner: The first assignment has no pedagogical value other than a grade so you stop asking me “how am I doing?” #overlyhonestsyllabi”
“@lesliemb: I have a sixth sense for plagiarism. Go ahead, try me. #overlyhonestsyllabi”
“@FitAcademic: Emails will be answered within 48 hrs because that’s how long it takes to bury the snark #overlyhonestsyllabi”
This tweet will be especially popular with academics at big R1 institutions where GTAs do most of the marking:
“@smsaideman: The number/length of writing assignments depends on how vigilant the teaching assistant union is #overlyhonestsyllabi”
In my view, the top tweet of the evening was:
“Before you take this class lightly, know my obsession with the subject matter has ruined two of my marriages. #overlyhonestsyllabi”
Hilarious!

Mark Blyth
That question was addressed by Mark Blyth, a Brown University political scientist, in a recent interview. For a podcast of the interview, see here.
Blyth said: “There’s a funny thing – it was a historian who made this point – I don’t know who he is, it was a British historian, and I heard this story and it makes so much sense. He said ‘Why is it that historians who actually know stuff about planet Earth never get listened to. Whereas an economist, who lives in an entire world of mathematical theorems that actually may or may not gel onto the world at certain points in time, but they’re really powerful.”
Blyth’s advice to historians and political scientists is that if they want their ideas to have some impact on policymakers, they should “dress it up in math.” Doing so, he suggests, would give them some additional credibility in our number-focused world.
I think that the more intelligent policymakers will be able to see through efforts to impress them by tacking on some numbers. Moreover, I would question the entire premise of this conversation, namely, the idea that historians have less influence over policymakers than economists. Blyth presents absolutely no evidence to prove that economists do have more influence over policy than historians and political scientists. (I’m not certain how one would go about quantifying it, but he doesn’t even try). Ezra Klein made a similar claim back in 2010, again with no supporting evidence.
I believe that historians have actually had a substantial impact on how a variety of political actors think about the present. These actors include legislators, Supreme Court judges, journalists, military leaders, and the general public. Historical ideas filter down into the thinking of decision-maker.
First, many of the economists who have recently influenced public policy are economic historians. They are based in economics departments, but they have also gone to the historical record to test the various theories their more theoretical colleagues have come up with. Consider Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff, two economic historians how used the historical record to suggest that once a country’s debt level reached about 90% of GDP, it passed a sort of tipping point at which all sorts of nasty economic consequences rushed in. As I have shown in other blog posts, their research, which has now been discredited, was cited by pro-austerity politicians in a number of countries. Of course, these politicians might have pursued exactly the same policies had Reinhart and Rogoff never published their findings, but the fact the politicians mentioned their research does suggest it has at least some influence over their thinking. I suspect their research was credible because they surveyed financial crises over a lengthy period, 800 years in fact. The historical aspect of their research set them apart from economists who were content with merely look at, say, post-1990 data or just some clever thought experiments.
Second, consider the “Industrial Revolution, ” a historical epoch identified in 1881 by a historian, long after the Industrial Revolution, which is conventionally dated to 1760-1830. The term “Industrial Revolution” was soon achieved common currency and is frequently used in political discourse today. It was used 3,117 times in the British parliament in the 20th century and structures how we think about social evolution and social policy. Note how there was a spike in usage in the mid-1980s, when the de-industrialization of the UK accelerated. Non-academics continue to use the term even though historians such as Warwick’s Nick Crafts regard it as a misnomer that obscures the very gradual nature of economic change in the period in question.
Third, future military leaders at institutions such as West Point continue to study military history. The study of historical military tactics has also influenced the teaching of strategic management in business schools. The aphorism that generals are always fighting the last war might also be applied to business leaders.
Mexican Cannon Captured in 1848 on Display at West Point
Fourth, ideas about history inform court decisions about issues ranging for gay marriage to the Second Amendment to Intellectual Property. If we wanted to quantify and test Blyth’s claim that economists are more influential than historians, perhaps we could do some quantitative analysis of, say, rulings by SCOTUS.

Chamberlain Meets Hitler
Fifth, diplomatic history structures how we think about foreign affairs. The thinking of US policymakers on decisions about whether to go to war is influenced by two historical examples: Neville Chamberlain and Lyndon Johnson, the first being a leader who didn’t go to war soon enough and the latter a leader who plunged into a war that ruined his presidency. Nobody wants to be either a Chamberlain or a LBJ.
In short, Blyth devotes energy to explaining a phenomenon that may not actually exist, namely the greater policy impact of economists,
I’m currently supervising a research student who is interested in the Americanisation of British business in the twentieth century (i.e., the adoption of American business methods).
We did a keyword search of Hansard, the records of proceedings in the UK parliament. Hansard has been digitized back to 1803. The full text is available online, open access. Here are the results of our search for Americanization/Americanisation. Here are the results:
The spikes in the usage of the term in the 1890s and 1930s are interesting and will require additional investigation. I was wondering if my readers can suggest any possible explanations. Feel free to speculate a bit here: the student will be doing lots of research later to test various hypotheses.